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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE DIVERSIFYING CORPORATION: SECTION 7
DARWINISM AND THE ELUSIVE BUT ESSENTIAL
TESTS OF THE MARKETPLACEt
The attempts of large corporate entities to diversify, that is, to
increase the number of different industries in which the corporation
operates, has, to a significant degree, spawned the recent wave of
conglomerate acquisitions. Analysis of a typical conglomerate corpo-
ration will yield a view of varied industrial activity ranging from one
end of the business interest spectrum to the other.' It is precisely this
aspect of diversification that engenders the difficulty encountered by
the Government in its effort to apply traditional antitrust law to con-
glomerate mergers.2 Briefly, the existing antitrust statutes were en-
acted to protect the competitive nature of the nation's industrial
structure, while many conglomerate acquisitions do not necessarily
exert a negative influence upon the competitive structure of any
industry, but merely substitute one competitive firm for another.3
This article will examine the utilization of section 7 of the Clayton
Act4 by the Government in the context of its far-reaching attempt to
t The author wishes to thank Harvey R. Blau, Scott E. Bohon and John T. Cusack for
their instructive counsel regarding this Note. Despite this indebtedness, however, the
author bears sole responsibility for its contents.
1 Northwest Industries, Inc., a corporation fairly representative of the conglomerate
species, derives its income from industrial activities in four major areas: railroad opera-
tions, industrial products, consumer products and chemical products. A more detailed
analysis of Northwest will be presented in a subsequent section of this article, but evexi
this cursory breakdown of its business pursuits dearly denotes a wide range of corporate
activity and interest.
2 As herein referred to, conglomerate mergers are those mergers between firms which
do not exist as direct competitors (horizontal), nor maintain a supplier-customer relation-
ship (vertical). Conglomerate mergers do include market extension mergers, product ex-
tension mergers and the so-called "pure" conglomerate mergers involving totally unre-
lated products, services and facilities.
3 The statutes are primarily applicable to those mergers of the horizontal or vertical
genus and the corporate abuses which flow from such combinations. The evolution of
the rules relating to such traditional problems has not provided standards which may
appropriately be utilized in the judicial examination of conglomerates, yet Congress has
not enacted legislation from which new rules may be developed. Instead, the formulators
of antitrust policy have vigorously propounded the applicability of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to conglomerate mergers. See, e.g., Hearings on Tax Reform Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2389 (1969) (statement
by Richard IV. McLaren, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Division); Hart, Emerging Paradoxes
in Antitrust, 30 ABA ANrrrusr SECriON 80 (1966); see also Reilly, Conglomerate Mergers
-An Argument for Action, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 522 (1966); Thomas, Conglomerate Merger
Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional Policy With Enforcement Policy, 56 FoRmDATA
L. REv. 461 (1968); Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., and 89th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-5 at 42-43, 85, 1865, 1960 (1964-1966) [hereinafter Concentration
Hearings].
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prevent superconcentration of the nation's economic resources and
power.
DIvERSIFICATION - THE UNDERLYING CAUSE
Although numerous motives have been attributed to the diversify-
ing corporation, the economic forces responsible are frequently of such
complexity as to preclude their positive identification and quantitative
assessment in particular situations. Among those motives often cited as
encouraging corporate diversification are the pursuit of economies of
scale in production, administration, financing and research and develop-
ment, and the use of spare resources, such as the presence of by-prod-
ucts needed in the manufacture of other goods produced within the con-
glomerate structure.6 Predictably, however, the most frequent and,
generally, the most readily discernible motive is entry into an industry
which affords an above-average rate of return.7 Stabilization of profits
also offers an important incentive to the diversifying firm, for the
greater range of corporate interest disperses the risk of a serious de-
cline in total earnings (which might otherwise result from the un-
foreseen alteration of an economically significant factor such as pat-
terns of consumption). Attempts to diminish the impact of business
cycles might also be categorized under the general motive of stabi-
lization. Finally, the desire for growth completes the compilation of
4 As used herein, section 7 of the Clayton Act refers to the section as amended in
1950 and presently operative. Section 7 as originally enacted read, in part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Ch. 823, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914). As amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, this
section now reads as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
5The most plausible area in which diversification would produce economies of
scale is research and development. The broader the spectrum of corporate activity, the
less tenuous the integration of a new development or product into the existing corporate
structure will be. See Gort, Diversification, Mergers, and Profits, in THE CORPORATE
MERGER 31 (W. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1966).
6 ld. at 35.
7 Id. at 38. The many difficulties which exist when a corporation is faced with this
type of decision include the duration of the greater return on investment and the powerful
competitive pressures which tend to equalize rates of return among industrie. in the
long run.
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motives most frequently attributed to the diversification-oriented
corporation: small growth potential in a company's principal activity
understandably tends to create a desire for diversification into areas
of high growth potential.8
Once a company has adopted a policy of diversification, the de-
cision-makers must determine the proper methodology to be employed
in attaining the long range goals of the company. The question will
generally be resolved by an initial determination of whether to pursue
a course of internal or external expansion. When a firm expands in-
ternally into an area with which it has minimal familiarity, handicaps
such as lack of know-how subject it to a competitive disadvantage
which may prove to have financially disastrous consequences. This
problem may be overcome if there is an abundance of capable manage-
ment personnel available in the original corporate structure, but if
the expansion requires a substantial increase in management staff
(and it generally does), the firm may find it quite difficult to obtain or
develop such personnel." In addition, an expansion-minded firm will
often view the acquisition-merger route as preferable to internal ex-
pansion for reasons other than the preexistence of a capable manage-
ment structure. For example, one commentator has noted:
Even when a firm is expanding its operations in fields with which
it is already familiar, merger may be cheaper than internal growth
because existing facilities can be acquired for less than what it
would cost to build them. The market for capital assets is often
imperfect: not all potential buyers know of the impending sale,
8 Other economic forces which have been regarded as contributing to the propagation
of conglomerate mergers include: the desire of the owners of small firms to convert their
holdings into more readily marketable securities; the opportunity to utilize more efficient
management personnel or techniques; the possibilities of cost reduction through inter-
woven product lines or methods of marketing- the tax advantages of direct reinvestment
of earnings; and the opportunity for merger-induced speculative gains which immediately
increase the earnings-per-share of the surviving firm. See 1968 WHrra HousE TASK FORCE
REPoRT oN ANTrrRusr Poucy, 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter
NEAL REPORT].
9 The external expansion route may also present personnel difficulties of substantial
magnitude, though of a different nature than those confronting the internal expansionists.
It is incumbent upon the latter to locate and develop management personnel capable of
assuming fundamentally autonomous executive positions in the newly-entered industry;
the former must concern themselves with the establishment of a centralized administrative
organ, capable of supplying services to all divisions of the newly-integrated organization,
from the individual agencies previously charged with such responsibilities.
A detailed comparison of the internal and external routes to diversification is beyond
the scope of this article. For a more complete comparison of the various aspects of each
method, coupled with suggested guidelines to be utilized in making such a determination,
see Whisler, Organizational Aspects of Corporate Growth, in Alberts & Segall, supra note 5,
at 183. See also C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTrrmuST PoLcY 128 (1959); Turner, Conglomer-
ate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1317-19 (1965).
1970]
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and so the price is not bid up to where the savings over new
construction are substantially eliminated.10
Finally, independent entry generally will not be attempted unless the
new firm can operate at a size which permits realization of economies
of scale. Absent a condition of increasing demand, independent entry
will distort the existing market structure; if the new firm is to operate
with maximum efficiency, it must appropriate established customers
from existing firms. Assuming that the existing firms were previously
producing at optimum levels, the new entry, if successful, would cause
such firms to realize some loss of the benefits derived from economies
of scale. Accordingly, the acquisition of a firm already producing at
the optimum level would be preferable to a possibly futile attempt
to attract customers away from existing firms. This may also be salutary
for the economy as a whole, for the decrease in single-firm volume re-
sulting from independent entry by a new firm may not be sufficient
to drive any one firm out of business; rather, it may be dispersed in
such a manner as to preclude any firm from operating at optimum
size. Clearly, this is not the most efficient allocation of limited re-
sources. 1'
Predictably then, the available statistics affirmatively demonstrate
that the balance between advantages and disadvantages appears to
favor external expansion in most instances. 12 However, such expansion
has created several complex questions which do not arise a fortiori
from the absolute quantity or value of corporate acquisitions, but
stem from the fact that "a relatively few very large companies ac-
counted for a sizeable portion of all large mergers."'u The Govern-
10 Turner, supra note 9, at 1318.
11 For a discussion of this factor in the context of Procter & Gamble's acquisition of
Clorox, see Ferguson, Anticompetitive Effects of the FTC's Attack on Product-Extension
Mergers, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rxv. 392 (Special Ed. 1970).
12 The sheer weight of the numbers would seem to validate this conclusion. During
the period 1948-1968, 1,276 manufacturing and mining companies with combined assets of
more than $53 billion were acquired. Approximately one half of these assets were acquired
within the last quarter of this period. BuRaAu OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIsC REPORT ON
CORPORATE MERGERS 43 (1969) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
By 1968, acquired assets were at least 55 percent as great as total new capital in-
vestment for the year .... [M]any large corporations were apparently preoccu-
pied in 1967 and 1968 with investing their financial resources and managerial
capability in promoting growth by merger rather than by investment in new
plant and equipment.
Id. at 42.
It should be noted, however, that the continuance of the current merger wave, in
light of the 1969 complaints issued by the Government and the. current infirmities of the
securities and capital markets, is far from a certainty.
13 Hearings on the Status and Future of Small Business in the American Economy Be-
fore the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 453 (1967).
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ment's objection is not to the trend of corporate diversification through
acquisition,14 but is essentially a reaction to the increased concentration
of economic resources arising from large-firm acquisitions. 5 Certainly,
an attack levelled against the acquisition of a leading company by one
of the nation's large firms, primarily citing the allegedly malevolent
effects of concentration upon the economy as a whole, would tradition-
ally be regarded as contrary to the fundamental premise of our anti-
trust philosophy and policy that size alone is no offense.16 Neverthe-
14 The currently operative statutes and the verve with which they are enforced by the
Government antitrust agencies have forced the traditional horizontal and vertical acquisi-
tions to assume a far less significant position. The table below illustrates this trend.
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MERGERS BY TYPE AND PERIOD, 1926-1968
1926- 1940- 1951- 1956- 1961- 1966-
1930 1947 1955 1960 1965 1968
Type (Percent of number of mergers)
Horizontal 67.6 - 35.1 22.7 16.4 7.7
Market-extension 8.3 - 4.1 7.4 6.1 0.9
Subtotal 75.9 62.0 39.2 0.1 22.5 8.6
Vertical 4.8 17.0 12.2 14.9 17.5 9.8
Product-extension
and other 19.3 21.0 48.6 55.0 60.0 81.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SoURCEs: Data for 1926-1930 are based on Carl Eis, "The 1919-1930 Merger Movement in
American Industry," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York, 1968,
at 146. Eis believes that his figure for horizontal mergers is probably high and his figure
for market extension is too low. Eis' data include only mergers where the acquired unit
had assets of $3 million or more. Companies with assets of $3 million in the late 1920's
were roughly comparable in size to those of $10 million in the postwar period.
Data for 1940-1947 are based on the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the
Merger Movement, A Summary Report, 1948, at 29. This study did not differentiate be-
tween horizontal and market-extension mergers. The figures are based on mergers of all
sizes and therefore probably overstate somewhat the volume of horizontal mergers.
Data for 1948-1968 were prepared by the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Com-
mission, and include only mergers where the acquired companies had assets of $10 million
or more.
FTC REPORT at 63.
In contrast, the incidence of conglomerate mergers has continued to rise; conglomerate
mergers far outnumber those of the horizontal and vertical variety. In 1967, of the
large mergers consummated, 83 percent of the number and 80 percent of the assets
acquired were of the conglomerate type. FTC Press Release (March 18, 1968). In 1968,
the percentage of large mergers attributable to conglomerates rose to 88.5 percent. FTC
REPORT at 61-62.
15 In the period 1947-1968, the share of total manufacturing assets controlled by the
nation's 200 largest companies (ranked according to asset size in each year) increased from
45.0 percent to 60.4 percent. FTC REPORT at 173. This increase occurred despite the
entry of more than 55,000 new firms into manufacturing activity during the period
1948-1966. Hearings on the Status and Future of Small Business, supra note 13, at 454-55.
16aIn 1966, Professor Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, stated:
Unless we can find some plausible theory, we will not attack a merger simply on
the ground that companies are large.
It is our position that this is not reasonable under existing antitrust law, if
for no other reason, although there are others, than that the issue raised by
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less, the vitality of this principle may be questioned today in light of
the policy statements of those charged with the enforcement of the
antitrust statutes, 17 and the allegations and theories advanced by the
enforcement agencies in currently pending litigation. s There are indi-
cations tending to affirm that in this sector of antitrust law, "mere
size" exerts considerable, if not conclusive, influence upon the Govern-
ment's determination of the need to institute suit.19 This preoccupation
of the enforcement agencies with the size of the merging firms symp-
tomizes widespread concern with the alleged acceleration toward an
unhealthy concentration of economic power 20-- concentration which
superconcentration should not be mixed up with the traditional issues of antitrust
law, namely, issues revolving around competition.
An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, 30 ABA A rrsT SECTION 100, 104
(1966). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
17 See, e.g., Address by Honorable John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United
States, before the Georgia Bar Association, Savannah, Georgia, June 6, 1969. Mr. Mitchell
stated that the Government "may well oppose any merger among the top 200 manufac-
turing firms" and "will probably oppose any merger by one of the top 200 manufacturing
firms with any leading producer in any concentrated industry." See also note 3 supra.
18 See generally the complaints filed in United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed Apr. 14, 1969); and United States v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (preliminary injunction denied). (A dis-
cussion of these cases and the prospective utilization of section 7 of the Clayton Act by
the Government appears in a subsequent section of this Note.) The importance which
attaches to the results of these conflicts is substantial because the Government, particularly
in its suit against LTV's acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc., has proposed two
original foundations upon which the applicability of section 7 may be expanded beyond
its present judicially-defined limits. This attempt to obtain a broadened judicial inter-
pretation of section 7 contrasts significantly with the increasingly accepted thought that
the statute has already been subjected to strained judicial application, and is being
utilized to perform a task for which it was never competently equipped. See generally
Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1231 (1968), wherein the author states in answer to those
who have suggested the "stringent" and "imaginative" application of section 7 to con-
glomerate mergers:
With all due deference to the good faith and intentions of those who have voiced
these pleas for action, it appears necessary to consider now whether such clarion
calls are misguided and futile. The old statute, even as amended and generously
interpreted by a sympathetic Supreme Court, may simply not be equal to the task.
Id. at 1231.
19 See, e.g., the complaint in United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No.
69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed Apr. 14, 1969); note 18 supra. There is evidence available, however,
that tends to refute the statement that the Government has adopted a "bigness is badness"
approach with respect to conglomerate mergers. Davidow presents the example of Litton
Industries to demonstrate how a merger-minded firm might avoid antitrust problems by
utilizing basic working principles. Litton Industries has consummated approximately 70
multi-million dollar acquisitions during the last 10 years, with the addition of more than
$400 million in assets to its corporate base, and not one of these became the subject of an
anti-merger action. Analysis suggests that the method utilized was the avoidance of signifi-
cant horizontal or vertical overlap and of acquisitions of firms ranking higher than fourth
or fifth in its market. But perhaps the most startling thought is Davidow's belief that there
does not appear to be anything in even the most recent cases to suggest that Litton would
face any antitrust danger in continuing its merger pattern until another $400 million or
more of disparate corporate assets is absorbed into its empire. Davidow, supra note 18, at 1270.
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supposedly will result in the cartelization of the American economy
unless immediately thwarted. Yet, the merit of the articulated evils
allegedly arising from this superconcentration 21 has been contested con-
currently with the applicability of present antitrust law to conglom-
erate mergers. The antitrust statutes appear to be designed to protect
competition, not to prevent concentration. 22 Indeed, it has been con-
tended that if such enforcement of section 7 is meant to exert a prophy-
lactic influence upon the economy, in substance, to prevent corpora-
tions from acquiring the power to implement the traditional methods
of monopolistic or oligopolistic abuse, it may well prove to be a mis-
guided and destructive effort:
[N]either justice nor the legitimate objectives of the antitrust
laws should be laid to waste in pursuit of questionable social and
political concepts or even the legitimate search for expedition. To
determine conglomerate merger actions on the basis of size and
Litton varied from its historical pattern of acquisition, however, when it acquired
two German typewriter manufacturers. The FTC is seeking to invalidate the merger on
horizontal grounds, alleging that the merger would eliminate the acquired firms as
competitors of Litton's Royal Typewriter subsidiary. See Litton Industries, Inc., No. 8778
(FTC 1969).
20 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 3. But see Rill, Conglomerate Mergers: The Problem of
"Superconcentration", 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1028 (1967).
21The evidence presented during the Concentration Hearings seems to provide a
consensus that concentration ratios (generally computed as that portion of value added
attributable to the four top firms in an industry on the basis of volume) across all indus-
tries had experienced no material alteration since 1947. Concentration Hearings at 3224.
22 The possible existence of other motives underlying the attack on size should not
be summarily dismissed. One such motive is the desire for expedition. Conglomerate
merger suits present highly complex economic issues which warrant resolution, and the
vast majority of antitrust matters caused by conglomerate acquisitions are not amenable
to the tests formulated by the Supreme Court respecting horizontal and vertical violations.
For the former, see, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). For the latter, see, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Despite the uncertain economic and statutory validity of these judicially contrived tests,
one can safely consider them determinative to date. See, e.g., Bison, The Von's Merger
Case-Antitrust in Reverse, 55 Gzo. L.J. 201 (1966); Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in
Antitrust, FORTUNE, Dec. 1963, at 138; Ways, Antitrust in an Era of Radical Change,
FORTUNE, March 1966, at 128. Nor are conglomerate mergers amenable to the rebuttable
presumptions which simplify both the trial and decision-making processes in vertical and
horizontal cases. See generally Adler, Merger Rules and Supreme Court Economics, 36
A.B.A. ANrr usr LJ. 4 (1967).
The courts generally seek as simplified a structure of analysis as possible to arrive
at a rational and equitable decision, see, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp.
244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966), the Government may
be utilizing the size-concentration theory in an attempt to simplify and thus expedite
litigation.
For a discussion of possible tax, securities, social and political motivations underlying
the antitrust attack on conglomerate mergers, see notes 334-35 and accompanying text
infra.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
hypothetical speculation as to the nexus between size and market
power, without undertaking the direct and specific market analysis
which proper application of the antitrust laws necessitates, is to
produce precisely that result.23
Clearly, the present state of the law with respect to conglomerate
mergers is unsettled and awaits development by the Supreme Court
in future cases; yet, an historical perspective may be gained from a brief
survey of major cases decided to date. This analysis will demonstrate
the expansion of section 7's proscription by tracing the evolution of
the statute's application to the various types of corporate mergers, and
should prove beneficial to an understanding of the heretofore untested
theories advanced by the Government in their recent actions against
conglomerate mergers.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE BROWN SHOE DECISION
Section 7 of the Clayton Act has, from its inception, been endowed
with extremely broad applicability.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
23 Rill, supra note 20, at 1030. Rill also discusses the common fears which exist in
relation to conglomerates. As abstracted from the testimony at the Concentration Hearings,
they are:
(1) Pricing and expansion practices- conglomerate firms might engage in below-cost
selling, heavy advertising and promotional activity, and "subsidized expansion"
in the markets they enter through merger.
(2) Procurement practices- conglomerate firms might, through their size and as-
sumed buying power, exact from their suppliers discriminatory discounts and al-
lowances which are unavailable to their competitors.
(3) Discouraging competition in the market of the acquired firm- conglomerate
firms might by their mere size and capacity for undertaking the described
pricing and expansion practices intimidate other firms in the market to "follow
the leader" and discourage new entry. Moreover, the merger itself might eliminate
a vigorous market force, less inclined to the "quiet life" than the acquiring firm.
Finally, competition might be eliminated through horizontal acquisition following
a conglomerate merger.
(4) Potential competition- the conglomerate merger might eliminate the prior
market influence of the acquiring firm as a potential competitor, and certainly
eliminates the possibility of its entry through internal growth.
(5) Reciprocity- the conglomerate merger presents the opportunity for reciprocal
trading whereby supplier-customers are induced to buy from the conglomerate
firm in hope of selling to it.
Id. at 1034-35. The conclusion derived is that no factual evidence of such consequences
was presented, but rather that the record was a "compendium of speculation respecting
the evils which a conglomerate merger might work." Id. at 1035.
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such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.2 4
The House Report in favor of the 1950 amendment declared its ap-
plicability "to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and con-
glomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effect of
substantially lessening competition . . . or tending to create a mo-
nopoly. '25 The 1950 Senate Report was more specific, defining the
objective of section 7 as the limitation of "future increases in the level
of economic concentration resulting from corporate mergers and acqui-
sitions." 20 With respect to the means for attaining this goal, the Senate
Report stated that "[t]he intent here, as in other parts of the Clayton
Act, is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and
well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman
Act proceeding ... ,"27 Similarly, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,28
the initially definitive interpretation of section 7, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, the author of the majority opinion, readily recognized that the
statute had been amended in order to terminate the trend toward les-
sened competition prior to the development of a more grave set of cir-
cumstances.29 However, while the general motivation underlying the
1950 amendment is rather clear, the application of the statute's prin-
ciples to specific cases has proven to be somewhat difficult. Indeed, the
legislative history has been assailed not for its deficiency in presenting
the aims of the statute, but rather for its failure to supply standards
24 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
25H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
26S. Rn'. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
27 Id. at 4-5. For a complete account of the legislative history of both the original
and amended section 7, see D. MARTIN, MERGMS AND THE CLAYTON Acr (1959).
28370 U.S. 294 (1962).
20 The then Chief Justice stated:
[lit is apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw
was the rising tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority
for arresting mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a
line of commerce was still in its incipiency.
Id. at 317. Several other "purposes" were perceived by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in the
debates and reports accompanying the passage of the amended section 7. These were (in
order of presentation): (I) revision of the original section 7 to encompass the acquisition
of assets; (2) deletion of the "acquiring-acquired" test to clarify section 7's applicability
to vertical and conglomerate mergers; (3) rejection of the more stringent Sherman Act
standards (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964)); (4) to articulate a favorable attitude toward those
mergers which would enhance competition, and to express the intent to protect competi-
tion rather than competitors; (5) to indicate a desire to prevent mergers which con-
ceivably might have anticompetitive effects and to protect those which might stimulate
competition; (6) an indication that the test of whether a merger violated section 7 had
to be functionally viewed in the context of the particular industry; and (7) use of the
words "may be substantially to lessen competition" to indicate congressional concern for
probabilities rather than possibilities. Id. at 316-23.
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beyond the realm of vague suggestions. 80 One commentator, discussing
antitrust legislation in general, has stated:
Committee Reports are often no more precise than the statute it-
self. Comments made on the floor of the House or Senate may be
even less useful: debates often resemble discussions of motherhood
or sin - one is either for or against; there are no subtle gradations
of opinion. Although such discussions may be useful to indicate
Congressional feeling or mood, condemning sin in the abstract
and in gross gives little guidance with respect to conduct that is
arguably not sinful at all.31
Thus, it has historically devolved upon the judiciary to ultimately
distill the true purpose of a statute from the morass of accompanying
hearings, reports and debates, and to formulate an interpretation con-
sistent with that purpose. Since an exception to this rule is not war-
ranted in the case of section 7, an examination of past applications of
that statute is extremely pertinent.
In Brown Shoe, the Government sought to prevent the merger of
the Brown Shoe Company, the nation's fourth largest manufacturer "m
and third largest seller of shoes, with the G. R. Kinney Company, the
eighth largest manufacturer and seller in the industry.33 The Govern-
ment alleged that the merger might have both horizontal and vertical
anticompetitive consequences; more specifically, that it would tend to
(1) eliminate actual or potential competition in shoe production on the
national wholesale level and in the retail sale of shoes, (2) foreclose the
substantial share of the market represented by Kinney's retail outlets
from competition, and (3) endow Brown Shoe with a competitive ad-
vantage over other producers, distributors and retailers of shoes.8 4 The
district court found the relevant lines of commerce to be men's,
women's and children's shoes, rejecting the Government's contention
that all shoes combined constituted the proper product market in which
to determine the anticompetitive effects of the merger. The court like-
wise refused to fragment the line of commerce further by differentiating
between grades, qualities, prices and uses of shoes. 5 The relevant geo-
graphic market with respect to manufacturing was found to be the
30 See, e.g., Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HAav. L. REV. 226, 233-38 (1960). Congress neither supplied nor eliminated any specific
tests for the delineation of the relevant product or geographic market, and failed to
suggest that a particular construction be given to the word "substantially."
31 P. AREA, ANTIrrusr ANALYSIS 5 (1967).
32 370 U.S. at 331.
33 The Court used dollar volume as determinative of rank in this industry. Id. at 297.
34 Id.
35 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 729-32 (1959).
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entire United States,3 6 while the areas of effective competition for retail-
ing purposes were held to be all cities of ten thousand people or more
in which a Kinney and a Brown Shoe store were located.37 In its find-
ings of fact as to the impact of the merger upon competition, the dis-
trict court noted the trend toward vertical integration in the shoe
industry; manufacturers had obtained control of many retail outlets
in order to assure themselves of a captive source of distribution for
their product and, in this manner, had prevented independent manu-
facturers from successfully competing in a segment of the market.3 8
Since the smaller enterprises could not cope with the national advertis-
ing engaged in by companies maintaining captive retail outlets, 9 the
number of shoe manufacturers subsequently decreased. Accordingly,
the court held the merger to be violative of section 7 due to the proba-
bility of vertical anticompetitive effects in the industry and horizontal
anticompetitive effects in shoe retailing.40
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. After a detailed discussion
of the origin and scope of section 7, the majority set forth the three
critical areas of analysis in a section 7 case - the relevant product
market, the relevant geographic market and the effect of the merger
upon competition. 41
In defining the relevant product market, the Court stated that
"the outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the rea-
sonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween the product itself and substitutes for it."4' The Court further
perceived the need to recognize certain well-defined submarkets within
a broad product market such as shoes, and proposed that certain indicia
be considered in the determination of such submarkets: namely, in-
dustry or public recognition, peculiar characteristics and uses of the
product, unique production facilities, distinct customers and prices,
sensitivity to changes in price, and specialized vendors.48 Relying upon
30 Id. at 732.
37 Id. at 735.
3Sld. at 737-38.
39 Id. at 738.
40 Id. at 739-41. The court held that the acquisition of Kinney's manufacturing facili-
ties would not be anticompetitive, as the combined share of the market would total only
slightly more than 5 percent. The Government did not appeal from this determination.
41370 U.S. at 324.
42 Id. at 325.
43 Id. The Court explicitly stated that the existence of a reasonable probability of
lessened competition in a "significant submarket" would be sufficient to proscribe a merger.
Id. Cf. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 592, 595 (1957); A.G.
Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585, 603 (3d Cir. 1962); American Crystal Sugar Co. v.
Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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these factors, the majority found the relevant product markets in the
instant case to be men's, women's and children's shoes.44
The criteria adopted by the Court for delineation of the appro-
priate geographic market closely resembled those utilized to ascertain
the relevant product market. Mandating that the geographic market
must correspond to commercial reality and be "economically signif-
icant,"45 the Court accepted the lower court's delimitation of the rele-
vant geographic markets - the nation as a whole on the vertical level,
and all cities of ten thousand or more people wherein the merging com-
panies had formerly competed on the horizontal level- as being the
realistic areas of competition.46
The sole determination to be made after the relevant markets
were defined concerned the impact of the merger upon competition in
these markets. Addressing itself to this issue, the Court found the
prospective effect of the merger in the relevant markets to be the sub-
stantial depletion of competition on both the vertical and horizontal
levels. It specifically noted as a factor in its decision the tendency to-
ward concentration in the industry,47 and more specifically, the trend
toward vertical integration. 48 Section 7 was enacted to arrest economic
concentration in its incipiency, particularly in those industries tending
toward oligopoly, and Brown Shoe had expressed an intention to utilize
the acquired retail stores to market its own shoes. 49 In conclusion, the
Court noted the absence of mitigating factors, such as the faltering
44 370 U.S. at 326.
45Id. at 336-39. See American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152
F. Supp. 387, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), afJ'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
46 Brown Shoe either owned, operated or controlled 1,230 retail outlets at the time of
suit, while Kinney maintained more than 350 retail outlets. The fact that both companies
manufactured shoes led to the charge of lessened competition on the vertical level, while
the maintenance of retail outlets by both was the basis of the charge on the horizontal
level. 370 U.S. at 297.
47 Id. at 345. The Court conceded that the primary index of market power is the share
of the market controlled by the top firms and the parties to the merger, but contended
that an analysis of the given market in terms of "structure, history and probable future"
is required before the net competitive effects of a merger can be determined. Id. at 322
n.88. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F.
Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
48 370 U.S. at 345. The propensity of large producers to combine with retailers, and
thus assure themselves of a greater number of distribution outlets for their products,
had led to this concentration of ownership.
49 Id. at 355-56 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark). Mr. Justice Clark differed
from the majority's definition of the relevant line of commerce and geographic market,
concluding that the former should merely be shoes (as opposed to the breakdown into
men's, women's and children's shoes), while the latter should be the entire country for both
horizontal and vertical analysis.
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business posture of one of the parties, which may have prevented main-
tenance of the existing competitive structure."0
The significance of the Brown Shoe decision stems from the
Court's adoption of a flexible and multi-dimensional test for determina-
tion of the relevant product market.51 This aspect of flexibility has led
to criticism of the decision as creative of unlimited authority in the
judiciary to delineate the relevant market as it sees fit;52 yet, it has also
been defended as the only approach to the definition of the product
50 To date, the failing company doctrine has achieved little judicial success. Under
this doctrine, which was initially formulated by the Supreme Court in International Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), the acquisition of a failing company by an industry leader
may be permitted if the competitive effect exerted on the market by the failing company
cannot be maintained in any other manner. In the recently decided case of United States
v. Citizen's Publishing Co., 394 US. 131 (1969), however, the Court proposed extremely
strict standards: the failing company must be on the verge of liquidation, and the buyer
must be the least anticompetitive acquirer.
The failing company defense has been criticized in United States Steel Corp., 3 TADE
REG. REP. 18,626, at 20,981 (FTC 1969). See generally Low, The Failing Company
Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 35 FORDHAM
L. REv., 425 (1967); Low, The Failing Company Doctrine Revisited, 38 FoRDHAM L. REV.
23 (1969).
51 It is interesting to note that each consideration found by the majority in Brown
Shoe to be relevant in determining the appropriate product market has a genesis in case
law which preexisted that opinion. Among these are:
1. Public or industry recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity.
See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); A.G.
Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296
F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y.
1958); Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
2. Peculiar characteristics and uses. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
8: Co., 353 US. 586 (1957); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, supra; United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Union Carbide Corp., supra.
3. Distinct customers. See, e.g., A.G. Spalding &- Bros. v. FTC, supra.
4. Distinct prices. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp., supra.
5. Sensitivity to price fluctuation. See, e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
For an analysis of each of these indicia and a brief discussion of the cases prior and sub-
sequent to Brown Shoe which utilized them, see B. Bocex, MERGERS AND MAP.crs 98-110
(3d ed. 1964).
More complete analyses of Brown Shoe appear in Symposium: The Meaning and
Impact of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 153. See also Barnes, The
Primacy of Competition and the Brown Shoe Decision, 51 GEo. LJ. 706 (1963); Note,
Examination of a Merger's Competitive Effects Under Amended Section 7, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
Rxv. 637 (1963); Case Note, 31 FORDHAm L. REv. 361 (1962).
62 Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power Concentration, Foreclosure and Size,
9 Vn.. L. R v. 211 (1964); Lewyn : Mann, Some Thoughts on Policy and Enforcement of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 50 A.B.AJ. 154 (1964).
Lewyn and Mann contended that Brown Shoe relegated to the Justice Department
unlimited authority to delineate a market which will reflect the highest percentage of
occupancy, merely because this method would prove to be the most facile route to victory
in a given case. As the post-Brown Shoe cases developed, it appeared that these fears were
not unfounded.
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market which, by competitive analysis, allows a court to distinguish
between those factors which are critical and those which are not.53
THE BROWN SHOE INDICIA AND DEVELOPING CASE LAW
Product Market Determination
In the product market cases following Brown Shoe, the Supreme
Court appeared to pay minimal tribute to the standards set forth in
that case. Indeed, any progress made toward the development of an or-
ganized approach to the delineation of a relevant product market54 was
nullified by the decision rendered in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa).55
In Alcoa, the acquisition by Alcoa of the stock and assets of the
Rome Cable Corporation was challenged as violative of section 7, with
the principal products involved being aluminum and copper wire and
cable. 56 Applying the indicia articulated in Brown Shoe, the district
court found that since insulated aluminum conductor could not be
viewed as separate from insulated copper conductor, the broader line
of all aluminum conductors was not a realistic line of commerce within
which to measure the effects of the merger upon competition. Instead,
the court held that all conductors constituted the relevant product mar-
53 Barnes, supra note 51, at 710.
54 Brown Shoe's attempt to formulate practical guidelines to which future definitions of
relevant product markets could relate experienced some success before the Court's decision
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US. 271 (1964). Reynolds Metals
Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962), is a good example of how the courts performed
the determination of the relevant product market prior to 1964. Other lower court and
FTC decisions of consequence during this period include United States v. Bliss & Laughlin,
Inc., 1963 TRADE CAs. $ 70,734 (S.D. Cal. 1963); United States v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp.
887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Brillo Mfg. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'. 16,543
(FTC 1963); Luria Bros. & Co., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,183
(FTC 1962).
In Alcoa, the Supreme Court reiterated the congressional intent to proscribe "[m]ergers
with a probable anticompetitive effect," which intent was deemed to abrogate the require-
ment of certainty needed to deal with the traditional "menaces to competition." 377 U.S.
at 280, citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (1963), and United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 658 (1964).
55 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
56 Aluminum and copper are the only materials commercially utilized in the produc-
tion of conductors for the transmission of electricity. There are two types of conductors,
bare and insulated. Rome produced both aluminum and copper conductors, but 90
percent of its production was devoted to insulated copper products. It produced 0.3 per-
cent of the total industry production of bare aluminum conductor, 4.7 percent of insulated
aluminum conductor, and 1.3 percent of aluminum conductor, a composite of bare and
insulated aluminum conductor. Alcoa produced no copper conductor, but controlled a
large share of total industry production in aluminum conductor. It produced 32.5 percent
of bare aluminum conductor, 11.6 percent of insulated aluminum conductor, and 27.8 per-
cent of the broader aluminum conductor line. Id. at 272-74.
Electric transmission lines are placed both overhead and underground. While alumi-
num has virtually displaced copper for overhead use due to the fact that such lines are
bare or not heavily insulated, copper is almost exclusively used for underground conductor,
which requires heavy insulation. Id. at 274.
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ket, with insulated conductor and bare aluminum conductor forming
distinct submarkets. 57 Finding no violation of section 7, the district
court dismissed the complaint.
Differing with the district court's determination, the Supreme
Court redefined the product market to include only the various types
of aluminum conductors. (The basis for this finding appeared to be
the different end-uses of aluminum and copper conductors, coupled
with the significant price differentials involved.58) Alcoa maintained a
27.8 percent share of the highly concentrated aluminum conductor
market, and while the acquisition of Rome would have increased its
share by only 1.3 percent, the Court deemed the resultant 29.1 percent
share so large as to place the merger in the presumptively anticom-
petitive category created by United States v. Philadelphia National
Bank.5 9 Thus, Alcoa provided that even a small increase in the market
share of a leader in a concentrated industry will add to the anticom-
petitive structure, and hence, will be regarded as violative of section 7.
The Alcoa Court's application of the relevant market concept in
a manner apparently designed to result in a very narrow product mar-
ket was merely an example of the coming trend toward "gerrymander-
ing" of the product market to achieve a desired result. In United States
v. Continental Can Co.,60 the Government requested divestiture by
the second largest metal can producer(" of the Hazel-Atlas Glass Com-
pany, the third largest producer 2 of glass containers. Here, as in Alcoa,
the determination of the relevant product market was vital to the out-
come of the case.63 The district court held that the Government had
57 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 509 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
The court did not consider insulated copper and insulated aluminum as separate sub-
markets under the indicia outlined in Brown Shoe. Id.
58 Although not determinative in Brown Shoe, the Court did set forth distinct prices
as an indication to be used. Several lower courts and the FTC, both before and after
Brown Shoe, emphasized price as constituting a meaningful factor in market definition.
See, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962); A.G. Spalding & Bros.
v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962); Union Carbide Corp., 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
59 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See note 87-99 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
this case.
60 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
61 Continental Can Company controlled about one-third of the domestic market for
metal containers. The industry was shown to be highly concentrated, with the top pro-
ducer (American Can Company) having a 38 percent share of the market. National Can
Company, third in the industry by volume, held only a 5 percent share, and the remainder
was divided among 75-90 small firms. Id. at 445.
62 The glass container industry resembled the metal container industry in terms of
concentration ratios. Hazel-Atlas was ranked third, holding approximately 9.6 percent of
the market, while the Owens-Illinois Glass Company was first with 34.2 percent and the
Anchor-Hocking Glass Company second with 11.6 percent. The balance of 44.6 percent was
divided among 39 other firms. Id. at 446.
03 The district court noted the existence of three industries in the overall competitive
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failed to prove a reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects in
any of the three relevant lines of commerce- metal containers, glass
containers, and both metal and glass beer containers." On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the product market included
both the glass and metal container industries, and all final uses for
which the two compete. Justifying this revision, the Court stated that
it "must recognize meaningful competition where it is found to exist."65
The opinion noted the differences in characteristics and uses between
the two types of containers, the dissimilar production facilities re-
quired, and the inability of consumers of either product to shift to the
other as price and other factors might make desirable, but concluded
that while these were "relevant and important considerations," they
were "not sufficient to obscure the competitive relationships" which
had been "compellingly" revealed by the record.6 6 The proper test to
be applied was, in the Court's view, "the existence of a large area of
effective competition between the makers of cans and the makers of
glass containers." 67
This analysis of the relevant line of commerce created a concep-
tual problem in that the defined market (combining metal and glass
containers) did not permit measurement of the influence of various
other types of containers, such as plastic, paper and foil, which vied for
the same business. Utilizing the Brown Shoe approach, Mr. Justice
White, the author of the majority opinion, attempted to rectify this
inconsistency by classifying cans and glass containers together as a
"well-defined sub-market" existing within the universal market of
metal, glass, and all other competing types of containers. However,
neither empirical analysis nor any other evidence was advanced in
support of this categorization.68
The Continental Can decision may intimate that the Court favored
structure: metal containers, glass containers and plastic containers. The latter, although a
comparatively young industry with small volume compared to that of the developed sec-
tors, had experienced consistent and substantial growth during the twenty years since its
inception. Id. at 446 n.4.
64 United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 806 (1963). The relevant
geographic market was not disputed; both parties agreed that it included the whole
country.
65 378 U.S. at 449. Mr. Justice White wrote for the majority in a 7-2 decision.
66 Id. at 450.
67 Id. at 455.
68 In a stinging dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, accused the
majority of using Brown Shoe as a "bootstrap." Id. at 472 (dissenting opinion). One may
find it more attractive to espouse the criticism that the practical standards of Brown Shoe
provide no basis for the segregation of metal and glass from plastic and other containers
than to search for the rationale behind holding metal and glass containers as constituting a
line of commerce distinct from all other competing types.
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a per se rule holding all mergers between large corporations standing
in an actual or potential competitive relationship violative of section 7.
The adoption of such a rule would mean that once actual or potential
competition is shown to exist between the acquiring and the acquired
firms, there would no longer be any need to delineate a relevant mar-
ket.69 However, while not explicitly articulating a per se rule to be
applied to future mergers, Continental Can appeared to reflect the
judicial attitude that the utility of the Brown Shoe criteria as a struc-
tural analytical framework for market determination was minimal. In
both Alcoa and Continental Can, the Supreme Court dismissed the
findings of the lower courts (which were embodiments of the Brown
Shoe analytical method and criteria) and substituted new markets and
submarkets that tended to sublimate the Brown Shoe tests.70 In addi-
tion, a comparison of the narrowly drawn product market in Alcoa and
the extremely broad market in Continental Can suggests the adoption
by the Court of a fundamentally result-oriented approach. As was noted
previously, in neither case did the Court adhere to the standards and
tests articulated in Brown Shoe; in both Alcoa and Continental Can
there appeared to be an initial determination that the merger violated
section 7, followed by the adoption of a relevant product market defini-
tion which was apparently designed to produce a finding of illegality
regardless of the validity of the supportive reasoning. Indeed, in Con-
tinental Can, the Government did not even argue in favor of the broad
line of commerce which the Court ultimately found. Thus, the rule
which emerges from the product market cases seems dear: the Brown
Shoe indicia properly applicable in determining the relevant product
market in a given case are those which place the merger in its most
unfavorable perspective. As will be seen, this construction is not unique
to the critical area of product market determination.
69 It should be noted at this time that in both Alcoa and Continental Can the Court
defined the product markets in a manner which allowed the mergers to be categorized as
conventionally horizontal when it would appear that at least in Continental Can, if not also
in Alcoa, the mergers could have been classified as conglomerate. Continental Can seemed
to present a typical product extension merger case; Alcoa involved a similar situation,
although not as clearly defined. The motive of the Court in adopting this approach may
well have been to disguise its philosophy, which attaches a negative connotation to in-
creased business size. Had these mergers been treated as conglomerate in nature, the
attainment of economic power in a purely financial sense would be the subject of judicial
condemnation. The relationship of conglomerate mergers to the problem of bigness is
discussed in Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The Curse of Bigness", 42 N.C.L. REv. 511
(1964).
70 The sole significance now attributable to Brown Shoe is in its providing the Court
with an intermediate foundation for unlimited authority in the choice of an applicable
product market. Indeed, it has been contended that Brown Shoe relegated such authority
to the courts prior to the Alcoa and Continental Can cases. See Hall & Phillips, supra note
52, at 219.
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Geographic Market Determination
The demise of the geographic market concept as propounded in
Brown Shoe71 was both swift and sudden. Only two years after that
decision, the burden placed upon the Government to prove the exis-
tence of a relevant geographic market was virtually abolished by the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.72
In Pabst, the Government brought an action to compel divestiture
by the Pabst Brewing Company of all assets of the acquired Blatz Brew-
ing Company.73 The complaint alleged that this acquisition violated
section 7 in that it tended to substantially lessen competition both in
the production and sale of beer in three relevant geographic markets -
the United States, the State of Wisconsin, and the tri-state area of Wis-
consin, Illinois and Michigan. 4 The district court dismissed the action
on the ground that the Government had failed to prove that either
Wisconsin or the tri-state area constituted a relevant geographic mar-
ket.75 A further ground for dismissal was the finding that the Govern-
ment had failed to demonstrate a substantial lessening of competition
in the United States, the only relevant geographic market.76 On ap-
peal,77 the Supreme Court reversed, stating that section 7 required only
a probability of substantial anticompetitive effects in any section of the
country; 78 the significance of that section in relation to the entire area
of effective competition between the merging companies need not be
71 The Court had stated: "The geographic market selected must.. .'correspond to the
commercial realities' of the industry and be economically significant." Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. at 336-37. And furthermore, "the geographic market in some in-
stances may encompass the entire nation, under other circumstances it may be as small as
a single metropolitan area." Id. at 337, citing United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189
F. Supp. 153, 193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), and United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
72 884 U.S. 546 (1966).
73 The Court found Pabst to be the tenth largest brewer in the nation and Blatz to
be the eighteenth largest. Id. at 547. The standard used to arrive at these rankings was not
stated in the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Black.
74 The complaint alleged violation of section 7 in the following ways: (a) Actual and
potential competition between Pabst and Blatz in the sale of beer has been eliminated;
(b) Actual and potential competition generally in the sale of beer may be substantially
lessened; (c) Blatz has been eliminated as an independent competitive factor in the pro-
duction and sale of beer; (d) The acquisition alleged herein may enhance Pabst's competi-
tive advantage in the production and sale of beer to the detriment of actual and potential
competition; (e) Industry-wide concentration in the sale of beer will be increased. Id. at
548 n.2.
75 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 481-88 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
76 Id. at 488-92.
77 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is permitted under section
2 of the Expediting Act in every civil action brought by the United States alleging a viola-
tion of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
78 384 U.S. at 549,
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considered. Moreover, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient
to show a section 7 violation in any and all of the three allegedly
relevant geographic markets.
Prior to the decision in this case, the question of whether a finding
of anticompetitive effect in one section of the country would relieve the
Court of any further obligation to consider the remainder of the area
in which the involved companies did business had gone unanswered.
In the earlier cases which had focused on a portion of, rather than every
section of, the country in which the parties to a merger engaged in ef-
fective competition, the limited market was clearly significant in rela-
tion to the total market area.79 In Pabst, however, the Court held that
proof of a substantial lessening of competition in any section of the
country, irrespective of the economic significance of that section in
relation to the industry in which the merger occurs, would constitute
a violation of section 7.80 Thus, the requirement that the Government
prove the existence and boundaries of a relevant geographic market in
order to successfully prosecute a section 7 violation, as set forth in
Brown Shoe, was eliminated.81
79 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360-62 (1963);
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 339-43 (1962).
80 Brown Shoe required that the relevant geographic market or submarket (I) cor-
respond to the commercial realities of the industry involved and (2) be economically sig-
nificant. The Government relied upon Brown Shoe as well as United States v. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 376 US. 665 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 US. 321 (1963); Crown Zellerbach
Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961); and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168
F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), to support its position with respect to the submarkets of
Wisconsin and the tri-state area. The district court reviewed and discussed these cases,
concluding that, while in a proper situation the effects of a merger should be tested in such
a geographic submarket, the Government had not proven that this need existed. 233
F. Supp. at 483. The district court further opined that the cases cited "involved fact situa-
tions substantially different from the facts" of the instant case. Id. at 483-85.
81 The Court held that "The language of this section requires merely that the Govern-
ment prove the merger may have a substantial anticompetitive effect somewhere in the
United States .... " 384 U.S. at 549. Any question as to the Court's right to eliminate the
geographic market' requirement can be countered by the fact that Congress did not adopt
or reject any specific method for the determination of the relevant market. See United
States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 378 U.S. 441 (1964); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1950).
It has been suggested that this dispensation in all section 7 cases may unjustifiably
proscribe mergers which would exert a positive influence upon competition, and thus re-
sult in unnecessary injury to the economy. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23, 1966,
at 8, col. 1:
When a merger reduces the number of competitors in an industry by one, Wash-
ington frequently scents tan anticompetitive effect]. In some cases the officials
may be right; in others the result of a merger will be increased competition ....
Unfortunately, antitrust officials . . . may worry mainly that a particular
region has one less local [competitor], disregarding the fact that the small firm, its
stockholders and employees would almost certainly prefer to merge instead of
slowly losing out ....
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Determination of the Merger's Effect upon Competition
The effect of the proposed merger upon competition, the third
criterion articulated by Brown Shoe for the determination of a section
7 violation, has given rise to another significant line of cases. In Brown
Shoe, the Court stated that an important yet "seldom determinative"
consideration in the analysis of the probable effect of a merger upon
competition is the "size of the share of the market foreclosed."8' 2 In most
cases, where that share is neither monopolistic nor insignificant, "the
percentage.., cannot itself be decisive."'83 Instead, the Court suggested
an analysis of certain "economic and historical factors" to determine
the legality of the challenged merger.8 4 Thus, it is understandable that,
despite the veritable flood of legal commentary assessing the true mean-
ing of Brown Shoe and its ramifications for antitrust merger law, 5 some
commentators believed that the case constituted a rejection by the Court
of per se rules or purely mathematical percentage-of-the-market tests.8 6
It is against this background that the Court, one year after its stoic ef-
fort to formulate a basis for empirical analysis in Brown Shoe, an-
nounced its decision in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. 7
The Philadelphia National Bank decision denotes significant
change in the Court's approach to section 7 cases -a shifting of em-
82 370 U.S. at 328. The Brown Shoe Court made an observation which is interesting in
the light of later decisions:
If the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches monopoly pro-
portions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated; but the arrange-
ment will also have run afoul of the Sherman Act. And the legislative history of
§ 7 indicates clearly that the tests for measuring the legality of any particular
economic arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent than those
used in applying the Sherman Act. On the other hand, foreclosure of a de
minimis share of the market will not tend "substantially to lessen competition."
rd. at 328-29 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The Court's conception of a "de
minimis share" has yet to be defined. The foreclosure of as little as I or 2 percent of the
national market may be found illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 264
F. Supp. 439, 462 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
83 370 U.S. at 329.
84 Id. The Brown Shoe Court noted that these factors include the "nature and pur-
pose of the arrangement," id.; "the trend toward concentration in the industry," id. at 322;
and a "prognosis of the probable future effect of the merger," id. (footnote omitted). Con-
cisely, there are four aspects of an industry and the merger's effect on its competitive
structure which should be analyzed:
(1) degree of fragmentation or concentration in the industry; (2) recent tendencies
toward domination of the industry; (3) accessibility or foreclosure of buyers and sellers to
each other within the relevant market; and (4) ease of entry into the market. Id. at 322.
85 Compare the views given by seven legal experts in Implications of Brown Shoe for
Merger Law and Enforcement, 8 ANTrrRusT BULL. 225 (1963).
86 See, e.g., Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 17 REcoiw
oF N.Y.C.B.A. 411, 433 (1962); Rahl, Current Antitrust Developments in the Merger Field,
8 ANTrrRuSr BULL. 493, 505-510 (1963).
87 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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phasis from competition to concentration."8 In Brown Shoe, the Court
had examined the various factors presented in the record before arriv-
ing at a decision based ultimately on the existent trend toward concen-
tration in the relevant market. Among these were the trend toward
manufacturer acquisition of retail outlets, Brown Shoe's policy of
forcing its own shoes upon its retail sellers, and the absence of counter-
vailing competitive, social or economic advantages.8 9 In Philadelphia
National Bank,90 however, the Court relieved itself of the task of such
88 This case may also mark the Court's entrance into the area of presumptive illegality,
an event caused primarily by the nature of the conglomerate merger. See Day, supra note
69, at 523-24. Day contends that in order to proscribe conglomerate mergers new tests
focusing beyond the structure of the relevant market had to be formulated to satisfy sec-
tion 7's standard of probable anticompetitive effect. The FTC created such standards,
looking toward the extra-market power assertedly derived from absolute size and diversifi-
cation (conglomerate bigness), which the Commission believes would have:(1) Quasi-vertical effects, because of the foreclosure of competition through the
application of "conglomerate leverage"; and (2) Quasi-horizontal effects by prob-
ably restraining competition and tending to concentration in the relevant market,
because of the "competitive advantages" of conglomerate-bigness and the elimina-
tion of "potential competition."
Id. at 525.
In a conglomerate merger, any effect on the existing competitive structure is neces-
sarily indirect, as no competitor, industry supplier or customer is eliminated. The ap-
parent substitution of one firm by another in the existing market had led to the assump-
tion that a conglomerate merger, by definition, could never be violative of section 7. See,
e.g., C. KAYSEN S. D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 131; Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-
1960, 51 Am. ECON. R.v. PAPERS & PROCEmINGs 236, 243 (1961); Adelman, Acquire the
Whole or Any Part of the Stock or Assets of Another Corporation, 1953 ABA ANTrrrusr
SECTION 111, 121 (1953); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo.
L.J. 672, 673-74 (1958); Jacobs, Mergers and the Small Business Man, 16 ABA AN'rrrmusr
SECTION 83, 85 (1960).
89 370 U.S. at 328-34.
90 This was the initial application of section 7 to commercial bank consolidations. The
Court rendered its decision despite the fact that the Comptroller of Currency had approved
the acquisition. Moreover, real doubt existed that section 7 was applicable to bank asset
situations. The district court had held that section 7 did not properly apply to bank
mergers involving asset acquisitions since banks were not corporations "subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission" - a condition required by section 7 for
the prohibition of asset acquisitions to attach. 201 F. Supp. 348, 358 (1962). Clearly,
section 7 would have applied if the bank merger had been consummated through a stock
acquisition, for the statute merely requires that the acquirer be engaged in commerce
before its prohibition of stock acquisitions becomes applicable. Id.
By the agreement approved by Philadelphia National Bank (PNB), Girard Trust Corn
Exchange Bank and the Comptroller of Currency, PNB's stockholders were to retain their
holdings, which would be representative of an equal number of shares in the consolidated
bank, and Girard shareholders would be given 1.2875 consolidated bank shares for each
share surrendered.
In reversing, the Court noted the absence of explicit reference to bank mergers in the
amended section 7, as well as the legislative silence regarding the failure of the 1950
amendment to exclude corporate asset acquisitions from the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion. 374 U.S. at 341. However, the opinion also stated that "the basic congressional design
dearly emerges and from that design the answers to these questions may be inferred." Id.
The Court acknowledged that the merger contemplated in this case was neither a pure
asset acquisition nor a pure stock acquisition, id. at 336-37, nn.13 & 14. Thus, on its face,
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broad examination by reducing the scope of consideration to one test
- concentration. The Court held:
[I]ntense congressional concern with the trend toward concentra-
tion warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive
effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm
controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market,
and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms
in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition sub-
stantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-
competitive effects.91
No determination was offered by the Court, however, as to the smallest
size at which a merger became "inherently" suspect of violating section
7.
section 7 was not dispositive of the issue. Rather, the determinative reasoning of the opin-
ion develops as follows:
Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give § 7 a reach which
would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations, from pure stock ac-
quisitions to pure assets acquisitions, within the scope of § 7. Thus, the stock-
acquisition and assets-acquisition provisions, read together, reach mergers which
fit neither category perfectly but lie somewhere between the two ends of the
spectrum.... So construed, the specific exception for acquiring corporations not
subject to the FTC's jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 only assets
acquisitions by such corporations when not accomplished by merger.
Id. at 342.
The Court enumerated the reasons upon which this construction was founded.
1. It constituted the only construction of the stock-acquisition provision of section 7
which would reflect the legislative purpose to embrace all commercial corporations, in-
cluding banks, and to abolish the unfounded distinction between acquisition by purchase
of stock and acquisition by merger in antitrust matters.
2. This construction covered all methods of acquisition, whether direct or indirect,
and was sufficiently embracing to implement the congressional intent to prevent evasion.
3. The object of congressional inclusion of the phrase "corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission" was "not to limit the amalgamations to be
covered by the amended statute but to make explicit the role of the FTC in administering
the section." Id. at 346.
4. The canon of construction that "'[i]mmunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly
implied.' California v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1961)," when com-
bined with the absence of any congressional desire expressed in the legislative history of
amended section 7 to exclude the banking industry, was controlling.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, contending that Congress intended the Bank Merger
Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c), to serve as the primary legislative tool for the regulation
of the banking industry. He rejected the contention of the majority that this legislation
was enacted solely as a result of the uncertain scope of section 7, and submitted that the
holding in the present case frustrated the goals of the Bank Merger Act and could not be
justified in terms of the 1950 amendment to section 7 or its legislative history. Following
a survey of the various characteristics unique to banks and a review of the legislative his-
tory of the Bank Merger Act, Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that "[t]his frustration of a
manifest congressional design is . . . a most unwarranted intrusion upon the legislative
domain." 374 U.S. at 386 (dissenting opinion).
91374 U.S. at 363. The Court justified this test as completely harmonious with eco-
nomic theory, stating the principle that "competition is likely to be greatest when there
are many sellers, none of which has any significant market share." Id. (footnote omitted).
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The decision in Philadelphia National Bank prevented a merger
between the second and third largest commercial banks of the 42 main-
taining main offices in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 92 Had the
consolidation been permitted, the resultant bank would have been the
largest in the area,93 controlling at least 30 percent of the relevant line
of commerce in the relevant market area.94 This market share was
viewed as undue concentration which would pose a threat to compe-
tition,05 and since no "evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely" to lessen competition to a substantial degree was presented,96
the merger was prohibited.97
Incidental to its holding in Philadelphia National Bank, the Court
rejected the defendants' assertion (which had been concurred in by the
Comptroller of the Currency) that the merger was desirable because
the larger lending limit of the consolidated bank would render com-
92 The City of Philadelphia and the three counties upon which it borders were found
to constitute the relevant geographic market, and commercial banking was determined to
be the relevant product market wherein the competitive effects of the merger were to be
judged. Id. at 356-62.
93 Id. at 331. The new organization would have had about 86 percent of total assets
of banks in the area, 36 percent of total deposits and 34 percent of net loans. Between it
and the second largest bank in the area, First Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. (the largest
prior to the merger), 59 percent of total assets, 58 percent of total deposits and 58 percent
of total net loans would have been controlled. The trend toward concentration was also
noted by the Court; the number of commercial banks in the area had declined from 108
in 1947 to 42 in 1962. In the 12 years prior to trial, PNB had acquired nine previously
independent banks while Girard had acquired six. Subsequent to the proposed merger, the
top four banks in the Philadelphia area would have controlled 78 percent of total assets,
77 percent of total deposits and 78 percent of total net loans. Id.
94 Id. at 864.
9 5 Id.
96Id. at 863.
97 The Philadelphia National Bank Court did not confine the test it created (see note
91 and accompanying text supra) to mergers resulting in significant increases in concen-
tration. Indeed, the test has been applied subsequently to mergers which involved firms
having very small market shares compared to those presented in Philadelphia National
Bank, and which would have resulted in much less formidable increments to industry
concentration. For example, Alcoa was concerned with a merger between firms controlling
27.8 percent and 1.3 percent of the relevant aluminum conductor market. Similarly,
Continental Can involved companies with shares of 21.9 percent and 3.1 percent of the
broad market defined by the Court, while the Pabst-Blatz merger, had it not been pro-
scribed, would have resulted in a firm with a 4.5 percent share of the national market,
found by the district court to be the only relevant market. See note 76 and accompanying
text supra.
In determining that 80 percent would be considered an "undue percentage share" of
the relevant market in almost all instances, the Court in Philadelphia National Bank took
special note of the divers structural antitrust tests which had been proposed by various
authorities:
Kaysen and Turner... suggest that 20% should be the line of prima facie un-
lawfulness; Stigler suggests that any acquisition by a firm controlling 20% of the
market after the merger is presumptively unlawful; Markham mentions 25%.
Bok's principal test is increase in market concentration, and he suggests a figure
of 7% or 8%.
874 U.S. at 364 nAI.
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petition with the nation's other large banks feasible. 98 In denying this
application of the countervailing power concept, the Court reasoned:
[I]f anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by pro-
competitive consequences in another, the logical upshot would
be that every firm in an industry could, without violating § 7, em-
bark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as large
as the industry leader.99
The Philadelphia National Bank decision did not consider that
situation where one of the corporations participating in the merger
maintains a high numerical position but a low percentage share of the
relevant market. Indeed, until the holding in United States v. Von's
Grocery Co.,100 most successful attacks on mergers had been directed
against situations wherein the combined company would control a large
market share.10 1 Von's, however, presented a case in which the combined
sales of the parties to the merger constituted a mere 7.5 percent of the
total sales in the relevant geographic market.
The contested transaction was the 1960 acquisition by Von's Gro-
cery Company of Shopping Bag Food Stores, a direct competitor in the
retail grocery market in the Los Angeles area. In 1958, Von's was the
third largest firm in the market in terms of retail sales, and Shopping
Bag was sixth. 0 2 Prior to the merger, both firms had grown rapidly;
Von's had increased its number of retail stores from 14 to 27 during the
period 1948-1958, while Shopping Bag had added 19 outlets to its base
of 15 in the same 10 year period.10 3 Von's sales quadrupled during this
time, doubling its market share, and Shopping Bag tripled its share of
98 The Comptroller of the Currency had justified his approval of the merger in this
manner:
[I]n view of the beneficial effects of this consolidation upon international and na-
tional competition it was concluded that the overall effect upon competition
would not be unfavorable.
Id. at 333.
99 Id. at 370. Further, the Court rejected, as of little consequence, the contention that
the consolidated bank would offer material assistance to the city and state in their efforts
to retain existing industries in the locality and to stimulate economic growth by attracting
new industry. Instead, the Court contended that a balancing of all effects of a merger
could not be competently performed by the judiciary; and even assuming that it possessed
such power, the Court noted that the statute proscribed all mergers with anticompetitive
effects, regardless of their countervailing beneficial results. Id. at 371.
100 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 US. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962). Brown Shoe may have foreshadowed the Von's holding, for in that case the
horizontal aspects were such that the resulting company would control only 5 percent of
the retail shoe market. The extensive vertical relationship between manufacturer and
retail outlets had led to the conclusion that a large market share was involved.
102 384 U.S. at 271.
103 Id.
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the market due to the growth of its sales by a multiple of seven.104 The
merger created the second largest grocery chain in the market.10 5
The Court based its decision primarily upon the trend toward in-
creased concentration in the retail grocery market in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area. 06 During the period 1950-1961, the number of
owners operating single retail grocery stores had substantially decreased,
falling from 5,865 to 3,818.107 Furthermore, by 1963 that number had
been diminished by 228 to 3,590.108 In contrast to this trend, the num-
ber of chains with two or more retail grocery stores had increased from
96 to 150 during the period 1953-1962.109 The absorption of the smaller
concerns by their bigger competitors was reflected by the fact that
during the period 1949-1958, 9 of the 20 highest-ranking chains
acquired 120 stores from formerly independent competitors." 0 Relying
on the above facts, the Supreme Court reasoned that the situation
presented was indicative of concentration in its incipiency, and that
the merger was violative of section 7. The congressional intent behind
the statute "was to prevent economic concentration in the American
economy by keeping a large number of small competitors in busi-
ness.""' The Court stated further that Congress had intended to pre-
serve this type of market structure by "arresting a trend toward con-
centration in its incipiency before that trend developed to the point
that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies." 1 2
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Stewart and joined by Mr.
Justice Harlan, declined to rest the decision on what it considered to
be the singular basis for the majority decision - reduction in the num-
ber of single-store operations in the relevant market area. Instead, Mr.
Justice Stewart contended that the district court's finding that there
had been no increase in concentration either before or after the merger
was adequately supported if concentration was measured by any stan-
104 Id. at 271-72.
10a Id. at 272.
106 This area included Los Angeles and Orange Counties; no party to the suit con-
tested this delineation of the relevant geographic market.
107 384 US. at 272-73.
108 Id.
1o9 Ad.
110 Id. at 273. See also the tables of food store acquisitions in the Los Angeles area.
rd. at 279, App.
3.1 Id. at 275.
112 Id. at 277. The defendants contended that the merger was not prohibited by sec-
tion 7 since the market involved was competitive both before and after the transaction,
and, indeed, might remain so in the future. The Court's rejection of this argument was
based on the trend of the market toward concentration and the intent of Congress to
prevent this gravitation toward ownership by "one or a few giants." Id. at 278.
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dard other than such reduction.113 Nevertheless, despite the dissent's
criticism of the majority for indulging in "a simple exercise in sums,"' " 4
analysis of the opinion reveals that the holding was based upon factors
derived from both the legislative history of section 7 and the case law
to which the statute had given rise. These factors were the increase in
concentration in the market generally, 115 the relative position in the
market of the parties to the merger, the protection of small businesses
and their owners, and the congressional desire to arrest a trend toward
concentration in a given industry prior to the advent of an oligopolistic
situation.116
BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION
Two additional factors should be discussed before commencing an
investigation of section 7's application to conglomerate acquisitions.
The first is another aspect of market structure: the ease or difficulty
a firm will experience when entering the area of competition. From the
perspective of antitrust law, the conditions of entry into a market may
have a substantial effect upon existing competition. 1 7 Low barriers to
entry exert a beneficial effect by posing a constant threat to the existing
firms. The mere presence of such a threat is frequently reflected in the
price and quality of the goods produced or sold, and new developments
in the production processes are more likely to occur in a highly com-
petitive industry than in one wherein the lack of competition allows
firms to operate profitably at far less than optimum efficiency. The
necessary corollary derived is that the formidability of the barriers to
113 Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion). The majority opinion criticized the conclusions
reached by the district court. There appeared to be an inconsistency in its findings of
fact; Fact No. 80 stated that there had been no increase in concentration in the retail
grocery business in the Los Angeles area, whereas Fact No. 23 clearly demonstrated a
decline in the number of individual store owners. The Court noted that for such findings
to be consonant, the district court necessarily had to have been using the term concen-
tration to indicate something other than the decrease in the number of competitors. Id.
at 273 n.3.
114 Id. at 282 (dissenting opinion).
115 The Court referred to information prepared by the FTC, and appearing in the
Government's brief but not in the record, demonstrating the rapid rate at which mergers
and acquisitions in the Los Angeles area had continued after the Von's-Shopping Bag
transaction. Id. at 274. However, the Court's reliance upon this fact may give substance to
the assertion that the "innocent" suffer for the excesses of the guilty, with the parties here
bearing the burden of the cumulative merger activity of many others in the industry.
116 The dissent insisted that the food industry was not highly concentrated. Id. at 286,
301-02 (dissenting opinion). For a somewhat different point of view, see Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 94-95 (1955), noting the high incidence of mergers in the food
industry and its possible contribution to the prevention of a decrease in food prices.
117 See C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, supra note 9, at 8.
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entry into a given market will determine the intensity of both the
threat posed by potential competition (the second factor to be con-
sidered), and the inducement to existing firms to operate at competitive
levels.11
In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court perceived Congress' intent to
require that the nature of barriers to entry be considered in a section 7
case, and questioned whether the industry "had witnessed the ready en-
try of new competition or the erection of barriers to prospective en-
trants.... ."119 Inasmuch as the barriers to entry into shoe retailing were
relatively low, this factor was not determinative. Since that decision,
however, high barriers have consistently contributed to the inval-
idation of corporate mergers, generally where entry was difficult
prior to the transaction and even less likely thereafter. Improb-
ability of new entry or of effective competition from a firm which does
enter has led to the conclusion in many cases that a merger may tend
to substantially diminish competition.120 Remarkably, however, parties'
to a merger in an industry having low barriers to entry have not
been benefited by this condition; 121 ease of entry has not been held to
justify the elimination of actual competition in a horizontal merger
case. 122 Indeed, it has proven to be of determinative significance only
when accompanied by the entry of new firms into the market.12 Yet,
while case law tends to ignore the effect of easy entry, the Justice De-
partment apparently considers this factor highly important in vertical
cases:
118 It must be noted that the nature of barriers to entry is of somewhat lesser con-
sequence in an industry composed of a number of firms with competitive tendencies ade-
quate to prevent any one firm from unilaterally exercising its market power in such a
manner as to affect the price, quality, or other characteristics of the product.
119 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962).
120 See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966); A.G. Spalding 8- Bros.
v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3rd Cir. 1962); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168
F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Brillo Mfg. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 16r543 (FTC 1963).
121 For example, the Von's Court invalidated a merger in the retail food industry,
which is characterized by particularly low barriers to entry. See notes 100-16 and accom-
panying text supra for a discussion of the Von's case; see also National Tea Co., [1965-
1967 Tranfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463 (FTC 1966), wherein the FTC held that a
violation of section 7 existed, although it found (in relation to a food store acquisition)
that there was relative ease of entry into the industry.
122 See Ekco Products Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,879, at
21,901 (FTC 1964), af'd 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965).
123 See United States v. National Steel Corp., 251 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Tex. 1965); United
States v. Bliss & Laughlin, Inc., 1962 TRADE CAs. 70,292 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd and remanded,
371 U.S. 70 (1962), adhered to on remand, 1963 TRADE CAs. 70,734 (S.D. Cal. 1963); United
States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); see also United States
v. Gimbel Bros., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction).
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The Department will ordinarily challenge a merger . . . between
a supplying firm, accounting for approximately 10% or more of
the sales in its market, and one or more purchasing firms, account-
ing in toto for approximately 6% or more of the total purchases
in that market, unless it clearly appears that there are no signifi-
cant barriers to entry into the business of the purchasing firm or
firms.' 24
Factors which have generally been held to affect the likelihood of
new entry into an industry are basically economic in nature. The most
obvious barrier is a large capital requirement 125 - a factor no less formi-
dable when the existing competitors are performing at less than op-
timum efficiency. The availability of capital is another determinative
factor, unless the entering firm is an established competitor in another
market prior to entry, with established access to capital resources. The
nature of the industry product may also be a bar.to entry in that the
required technical knowledge may not easily be acquired; or patents
and trade secrets may be unavailable.126 The nature of the demand for
an industry's goods or the necessity of a widely recognized brand name
for competitive success' 27 may have a similar effect. Finally, the charac-
ter of the market's competitive structure may affect the attractiveness
of entry.12 8 The presence of only a few large buyers would tend to dis-
courage entry, as it may prove impossible to upset established buyer-
seller relationships. The more numerous and less significant the
individual buyers are, the more likely is the prospect for effective com-
petition with existing firms.129
In vertical mergers, slightly different factors constitute barriers to
entry. These may include large plant investment in relation to sales,130
124 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusrIcE, MERGER GUIDELINES: ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR SEC-
TION 7, CLAYTON ACr 12 (May 30, 1968) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELNES].
125 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Union Carbide Corp.,
59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
126 See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 9, at 73.
127 See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 555, 559 (1966) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
128 See, e.g., Brillo Mfg. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,543
(FTC 1963); Ekco Prods. Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,879 (FTC
1964).
129 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Two other cases are worthy of notation in the context of barriers to entry and the
invalidation of horizontal mergers. In Philadelphia National Bank, the Court found that
the governmental regulation of the commercial banking industry constituted a barrier to
entry. 374 U.S. 321, 367 n.44 (1963). Similarly, in American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second Circuit found that a federal
regulatory statute discouraged new entry. (The National Sugar Act provided for a quota
system on the importation of sugar. 7 U.S.C. §§ 608a, 1119 (1964).)
130 See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196, 225 (D.N.J. 1966);
Scott Paper Co., 57 F.T.C. 1415, 1438 (1960).
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inaccessibility of resources or markets,131 the risk burdening a new en-
trant in attempting to compete with firms entrenched in the market,
and extensive vertical integration among the industry leaders. This last
factor might preclude successful entry on one level alone, and the new
entrant may not have the capital required to compete on both levels.
After the existence and extent of the barriers to entry are deter-
mined, the effect of entry by the acquiring firm upon those barriers
must be analyzed. This analysis must include an evaluation of those
firms, if any, which constitute the most probable entrants, and lays a
foundation for the consideration of another judicial application of sec-
tion 7- the proscription of mergers which eliminate potential
competition. As was indicated previously, potential competition is sig-
nificant only when the firms in the market to be entered do not generate
sufficient competition to warrant optimum performance by each firm.
Additionally, another factor must be present for a potential competitor
to influence competition - the recognition of the potential competitor
as such by the existing firms in the market. In this context, the focus
now turns to an examination of the judicial notice accorded the anti-
competitive effects resulting from the elimination of the force exerted
on an industry by potential competition.
Shortly after the Brown Shoe opinion was rendered, the Supreme
Court decided two cases strictly in reliance upon the effect that the
mergers may have exerted upon potential competition. In the first,
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,' w the Court held that the
acquisition of the Pacific Northwest Pipeline Company by the El Paso
Natural Gas Company was violative of section 7 since the transaction
would result in the elimination of a potential competitor. El Paso was
the sole foreign supplier of natural gas in California with more than a
50 percent market share, the remainder being divided between various
intrastate sources. It had actively attempted to acquire Pacific North-
west since 1954, two years before the actual exchange of shares. Prior
to the merger, Pacific Northwest had exerted considerable effort to
enter the California market, but had been unsuccessful due to the
response of El Paso, which had granted its customers substantial conces-
sions in price and had firmly committed itself to service. The Court
131 For example, in United States v. Standard Oil Co. 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966),
the Court found that a scarce supply of available potash caused the acquisition of the top
potash producer by Standard Oil to be violative of section 7.
132 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Douglas, with all
participating justices agreeing that the merger was illegal. Mr. Justice Harlan dis-
sented only from the majority order of divestiture, contending that the district court was
the appropriate arena for determining the necessary relief. Id. at 662-64.
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concluded that although Pacific Northwest was not an actual competi-
tor, it nevertheless constituted a substantial factor in the relevant
market at the time of acquisition. It was the only significant interstate
pipeline in the West (other than El Paso), and its actions warranted
reaction by El Paso to assure retention of its market. In addition, re-
calling that one purpose of section 7 was to arrest the tendency toward
monopoly before the consumer's alternatives disappeared, the Court
found that had Pacific Northwest remained autonomous, it would have
at least attempted to enter the California market. The probability of
its success was irrelevant; "unsuccessful bidders are no less competitors
than the successful one."'138 El Paso thus introduced a new factor to be
considered when determining the legality of a merger: the merger's
effect upon probable future, as well as existing, competition. And al-
though this potential competition test injected an element of uncer-
tainty into the task of determining the possible anticompetitive effects
of a merger, this uncertainty did not appear to affect the Court's hold-
ing in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 184 decided less than
three months after El Paso.
Penn-Olin marked the Court's initial consideration of section 7's
applicability to joint ventures. Predictably, the Court ruled that section
7 was applicable, even if the parent companies had occupied the status
of mere potential competitors at the time of the joint company's forma-
tion.13a
Pennsalt's sole industrial activity was the production and sale of
chemicals and chemical products throughout the nation. It produced
sodium chlorate in Oregon, and controlled 57.8 percent of the market
west of the Rocky Mountains. From 1957 to the time of suit, Pennsalt
also sold sodium chlorate in the southeast, mostly through its sales
agency contract with Olin, and maintained an 8.9 percent share of the
133 Id. at 661.
184 378 U.S. 158 (1964). Mr. Justice Clark spoke for the Court; Mr. Justice Douglas
dissented in an opinion joined by Mr. Justice Black; Mr. Justice White dissented without
opinion; and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in an opinion of only two sentences, contending
that the Court should not allow the Government a second opportunity to win a case
that it properly lost. Id. at 183.
185 Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemicals Corporation were
found by the Court to be potential competitors when they formed the Penn-Olin Chemical
Company in 1960. Each parent owned one-half of the new company's stock, and corporate
management was also equally divided. The purpose of the new company was to produce
and market sodium chlorate in the southeastern part of the United States, a market pre-
viously dominated by two firms controlling a 90 percent share.
Penn-Olin's plant was built with funds contributed equally by the parent companies,
and operations commenced in 1961. Pennsalt was responsible for plant operations, while
Olin handled sales. Penn-Olin was not involved with any chemicals other than sodium
chlorate. Id. at 163.
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market in that area. Conversely, Olin, a larger, diversified corporation
formed by the merger of Olin Industries, Inc. and Mathieson Chemical
Corporation in 1954, consisted of seven divisions, one of which operated
plants which produced various chemical products in 15 states. These
operations yielded approximately 30 percent of Olin's revenues. 136 Prior
to the formation of Penn-Olin, both Pennsalt and Olin had considered
entry into the southeast sodium chlorate market; Pennsalt had decided
against such independent entry, while Olin had yet to reach a firm
decision.
Contending that section 7 applied only to firms existing in com-
merce at the time of acquisition, Penn-Olin pointed out that at the time
of creation, the challenged joint venture was not engaged in commerce.
However, the Court held this fact to be irrelevant, for at the time of
suit Penn-Olin was engaged in commerce, and further, both parties to
the joint venture were formerly in commerce and the joint venture
was intended to engage in commerce. A contrary ruling, the Court con-
tended, "would create a large loophole in a statute designed to close a
loophole."'1 7 The joint venture was similar, in the view of the majority,
to the "merger" and "conglomeration" which often create anticom-
petitive dangers.
The district court had held that each parent company was capable
of entering and competing in the relevant market, and could have done
so with profit.138 But the test applied there was whether there existed
the probability that both would have entered the market individually
had the joint venture not been consummated. The court could not
conclude that this reasonable probability existed, and did not deter-
mine the chance of one entering and one remaining on the edge. Con-
sequently, it held that "no reason exists to suppose that Penn-Olin will
be a less effective competitor than Pennsalt or Olin would have
been." 3 9 However, in reversing, the Supreme Court rejected this ap-
proach and held instead that the joint venture would be lawful only if
neither parent would have entered the market independently. The
Court observed that the lower court should have considered the fact
that the joint venture eliminated the possibility of potential competi-
tion posed by the firm that may have remained aware of the market's
potential for profitable operation and continually threatened to enter.
136d. at 162-63. After presenting these facts, the Court attempted to analyze the
industry, utilizing statistics and historical background to demonstrate the propensity of
both parent companies to enter the market. Id. at 163-67.
137 Id. at 168, citing United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 343 (1963).
138 217 F. Supp. at 110, 129.
1301d, at 131.
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If permitted, "this joint venture may well foreclose any prospect of
competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the relevant sodium chlorate
market."' 40 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of the probability that either party to the
joint venture would have entered the market "while the other would
have remained a significant potential competitor."'141
THE PROBLEM OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
The trend toward conglomerate mergers, which developed sub-
sequent to the Supreme Court's decisions in the cases discussed thus far,
presents a different set of problems for consideration. A conglomerate
merger, by definition, is a merger involving parties that are neither
competitors nor related as supplier-customer. Thus, any merger not
horizontal or vertical in nature may be classified as conglomerate.
There are various divisions within the conglomerate merger category,
however, which have proven to be analytically useful. One is the
market-extension merger, a merger of companies which deal in the
same product but in different geographic markets. Another type is the
product-extension merger, where the parties are concerned with prod-
ucts which can be produced with similar facilities or distributed
through the same channels. Finally, those mergers involving companies
with seemingly no economic relationship are classified as pure con-
glomerate mergers. Problems may arise from these pure mergers, how-
ever, when the buyers or potential buyers from one of the participating
firms are suppliers to the other, or are customers of the other in a
different market. In such circumstances, a company might utilize its
position as a buyer or supplier to obtain the trade preference of its
suppliers or customers. More graphically, suppose X and Y are the
acquiring and the acquired companies respectively, and Company Z,
a potential customer of X, is a supplier of Y. Combined X and Y may
condition purchases from Z upon Z's purchase of its needs in other
areas from X-Y. In order to continue its sales to X-Y, Z may be coerced
140 378 U.S. at 173.
141 Id. at 176. The Court then enumerated a variety of factors which the trial court
could utilize in assessing the probability of a substantial lessening of competition, con-
cluding the list with a reminder that "[in weighing these factors the court should re-
member that the mandate of the Congress is in terms of the probability of a lessening of
substantial competition, not in terms of tangible present restraint." Id. at 177.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the record sufficiently demonstrated
anticompetitive effects, thereby rendering remand to the district court unnecessary. Id. at
182-83.
On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that no reasonable
probability existed that Pennsalt or Olin would have entered independently. 246 F. Supp.
917 (D. Del. 1965).
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into buying goods from X-Y when previously it had bought from
others; thus foreclosing the competitors of X-Y from the share of sales
represented by Z's purchases.
That section 7 was intended to apply to conglomerate mergers is
not often the subject of debate.'4 It has been proposed, however, that
the language of the statute inhibits its effectiveness as a control over
conglomerate mergers, for it prohibits only those mergers which may
lessen competition in a specific product and geographic market, and
not those which may be harmful for various other reasons. 143 To date,
the Supreme Court has found reason to apply section 7 to virtually
all mergers brought to it for consideration; yet, the current state of
the law with respect to conglomerate mergers is relatively unsettled.
Presented here is an outline of the decisions relating to this problem,
culminating in a detailed analysis of the recent suits brought by the
Government against several large diversification-oriented corpora-
tions.144
THE EARLY CONGLOMERATE CASES
As noted above, it may be contended that the conglomerate
acquisition is in fact unassailable under the terms of section 7, since
the transaction, which merely results in the substitution of one com-
petitor for another, neither reduces the number of competitors nor
intensifies concentration in the relevant market.145 But the elemental
query in a section 7 case is whether the combination will result in a
substantial lessening of competition in any relevant market, and de-
cisional law has held that in certain instances, conglomerate mergers
will endow the combined enterprise with such economic power, re-
sources or other competitive advantages that there exists the probability
of a substantial lessening of competition.'4" For instance, one of the
142 The section was intended to apply "to all types of mergers and acquisitions, ver-
tical and conglomerate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substan-
tially lessening competition . . . or tending to create a monopoly." H. R. REP'. No. 1191,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949). See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294, 317
(1962).
The challenge has not been to the applicability of the statute; rather, the criticism
has been directed at its alleged inability to proscribe various mergers. See Davidow, supra
note 18, at 1231.
143 See Davidow, supra note 18, at 1237-38.
144 See United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969); United
States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1969).
145 See generally Adelman, The Antimerger Act, supra note 88, at 243.
146 The possible anticompetitive dangers posed by conglomerate acquisition are:
1. Pricing practices that may eliminate smaller competitors or tend to diminish their
competitive efforts;
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primary allegations advanced by the Government in its suits against
conglomerate mergers has been the probability that, subsequent to
the merger, the acquiring company would impose reciprocal practices
upon those firms with which it deals. 147 This issue of reciprocity, as
it related to corporate mergers, received extensive treatment in FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp.148 In 1951, Consolidated, a large diversified
processor, wholesaler and retailer of food products, acquired Gentry,
Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic. Prior to the
merger, Gentry accounted for 28 percent of dried onion sales, while
Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., the top firm in the industry, controlled
60 percent. By 1958, the shares were 35 percent and 57 percent re-
spectively. As for sales of dehydrated garlic, Gentry had a 51 percent
share of the market before the merger and 39 percent in 1958, while
Basic's share amounted to 35 percent in both years. In 1958, the FTC
challenged the merger as violative of section 7, alleging that it endowed
upon Gentry an anticompetitive advantage, in the nature of reciprocal
buying, which would tend (1) to foreclose a substantial share of the
2. Intimidation of economically less powerful competitors in order to exert less
aggressive competitive effort;
3. Elimination of the threat of entry posed by the acquiring company as a potential
competitor (primarily in market extension mergers);
4. Dilution of the threat of entry by other recognized potential competitors;
5. Elimination of the possibility that the acquiring company might enter by internal
expansion;
6. Reduction of the potential for increased competition by deterring new entry;
7. Creation of certain economies of scale regarded as undesirable for the promotion
of competition (e.g., advertising discounts and prestige lent by the transfer of a well-known
brand name);
8. Utilization of similarity of products to realize selling and marketing preferences
(occurring mainly in product extension situations where advantages include preferred
display space on the retail level, increased access to customers, etc.);
9. Creation of potential for leverage reciprocity (B buys from A to insure A's con-
tinuing to either buy from or sell to B), mutual reciprocity ("I'll buy from you if you'll
buy from me'), or mere voluntary purchases made with the hope (or possibly expectation)
that the seller will reciprocate.
For an analysis of each of the foregoing possibilities, see 13 B. Fox & E. Fox, BusNEss
ORGANIZATIONS chs. 11-13 (1968). See also note 23 supra.
147 Reciprocal buying had been condemned as anticompetitive prior to its application
in conglomerate acquisition situations. See, e.g., California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379
(1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932); Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931);
cf. United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 186 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
916 (1951) (requirements contract in return for purchases of stock).
148 380 U.S. 592 (1965). The extension of section 7's proscription to those mergers
which present the possibility of reciprocal buying may have been foreshadowed by the
language of the court in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir.
1963), where, after discussing the advantages involved as relevant to the factual situation
present, the court concluded that "[tjhis [reciprocity] is particularly destructive of compe-
tition because it transforms substantial buying power into a weapon for denying competi-
tors less favorably situated access to the market." Id. at 524.
[VOL. 44:677
SECTION 7
market from other competitors, (2) to foster rigidity in an extremely
concentrated industry, and (3) to discourage new entrants.
In declaring the merger illegal, the FTC emphasized the structure
of the industry and the historical application of section 7 to prevent
the alteration of an industry's competitive structure by corporate
acquisitions which are likely to result in a substantial lessening of
competition. Subsequent to the merger, Consolidated was simul-
taneously a seller of dehydrated onion and garlic and a purchaser from
food processors who used these ingredients in their products. The
Commission found that the merger presented opportunities for sales
in one market which were basically dependent upon buying power in
another market, thus posing a serious threat to competition. 149 Never-
theless, on appeal,150 the Seventh Circuit reversed, apparently per-
suaded by evidence relating to the post-merger behavior of the market.
The court admitted that situations existed where reciprocity had led
to the substantial diminution of competition, but held:
[H]ere, ten years of post-acquisition experience - during which
Consolidated attempted overt enforcement of reciprocal buying
practice where it deemed it might be successful - serves to demon-
strate that neither the acquisition of Gentry, in and of itself, nor
the overt attempts to use buying power to influence sellers to
Consolidated to purchase from Gentry resulted in substantial
anticompetitive effect. No substantial impact on the relevant
market occurred, and absent some factor which requires a different
approach we are of the view that the experience reflected by this
post-acquisition period must weigh heavily in appraising future
probabilities.' 5 '
The Supreme Court reversed, and, while conceding that the ev-
idence concerning the post-acquisition period was entitled to con-
sideration, held that it did not warrant the degree of importance
accorded it by the Seventh Circuit. 52 Mr. Justice Douglas spoke for
the Court, and stated at the outset that "the 'reciprocity' made possible
by such an acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive prac-
149 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 3 TRADE Rr. REP. 16,182 (1962), rev'd, 829
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
150 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1963).
151 Id. at 626. The court further noted that Gentry's market share in garlic sales had
decreased during the period after the merger. This fact led to the conclusion that if the
increase in Gentry's share of the onion market had resulted from business reciprocity,
there should have been a similar increment to its share of the garlic business.
152 380 U.S. 592, 598 (1965). The majority added that post-acquisition evidence could
be utilized to prove a section 7 violation even where no probability of anticompetitive
effects could have been established prior to or at the time of the merger.
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tices at which the antitrust laws are aimed."' 53 Reciprocal dealing re-
sulting from an acquisition would be violative of section 7 if the
probability existed that competition would be substantially impaired.15 4
The Court then noted the FTC determination that Gentry would
possess an unfair advantage over competitors merely as a result of its
combination with Consolidated, and held that the post-merger evidence
could not override the FTC finding that a probability of reciprocal
buying existed.155 The Court believed that, if given a trial period
within which to prove good faith, the parties would refrain from
utilizing their power until such time as the post-acquisition evidence
determined the case in favor of the merger. Section 7 was enacted to
deal in probabilities, and what later occurs should simply not be viewed
as conclusive. 156
It was apparent from this decision that the Court not only agreed
with the FTC position that potential reciprocity is worthy of con-
demnation, but would, in future cases, proscribe any merger that
resulted in a situation conducive to reciprocity. This projection, if
accurate, would mean that whenever diversification by acquisition
resulted in a potential for reciprocity, the merger would be held il-
legal. Accordingly, the possibility certainly exists that conglomerate
mergers, which are inherently suspect of plans for the future exercise
of reciprocity, might not generally curry favor within the judiciary. 57
153 Id. at 594.
1354 Id. at 595. Later in the opinion, the Court stated that "the 'mere possibility' of the
prohibited restraint is not enough." Id. at 598.
'55 Id. at 599-600. The Court qualified this by adding that the FTC finding should be
founded upon substantial evidence. It is interesting to note that while Gentry's share of
onion sales rose 7 percent after the merger, its share of garlic sales decreased 12 percent.
The Court held that the Commission was on "safe ground" in finding that the garlic
decrease did not condusively refute the existence of reciprocity, as the decrease did not
positively demonstrate that, absent the effect of reciprocity, the share would not have
decreased even more. Id. at 599. Yet, no mention was made of the possibility that onion
sales might have increased for any reason other than reciprocity, although evidence was
presented to show the improvement in quality of Gentry's product.
156 Id. at 598.
157 The existence of a potential for reciprocal dealing does not automatically lead to
employment of such practices. Aside from ethical considerations, reciprocity is not easily
implemented in many large corporations. Trade relations programs are expensive, and
many doubt that the return justifies the cost. Reciprocity may prove to be unprofitable due
to its effect of weakening competition between suppliers, thus leading to higher price and
lower quality. Lastly, conglomerate firms generally have many profit centers, with inde-
pendent management operating each division of the larger corporation. These managers
are judged by their ability to make a profit, and rarely will one settle for the lower quality
and higher price that generally accompany reciprocal dealing. See Geneen, Concepts of a
Conglomerate or a Multi-Market Company-A Businessman's View, 25 Bus. LAw. 559,
566-67 (1970), wherein the structure of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corpo-
ration is discussed in relation to the viability of reciprocal buying; cf. Liebeler, The Em-
peror's New Clothes: Why Is Reciprocity Anticompetitive?, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS A
AcQuIsMoNs: OPINION & ANALYsis, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 545 (Special Ed. 1970); see also
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The Supreme Court's second major decision concerning conglom-
erate mergers was rendered in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.158 Since
the FTC attack appeared to be founded strictly upon the size of the
acquiring corporation, the decision was eagerly awaited, as many hoped
that the Court's holding would detail the manner in which section 7
would be applied to conglomerates. 159
In October 1957, the FTC fied suit challenging the August 1957
acquisition of all Clorox Chemical Company'60 assets by the Procter &
Gamble Company,' 61 and subsequently concluded that the acquisition
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 80 LAW AND CON-
TEMP. PROB. 552 (1965); Comment, Reciprocal Dealing, 76 YALE L.J. 1020 (1967). Further
economic discussion of reciprocity may be found in Coase, Working Paper II: The Con-
glomerate Merger (working paper for the Task Force on Productivity and Competition),
2 AzNrnusr L. & ECON. Ray., Spring 1969, at 45; Stigler, Working Paper IV: Reciprocity,
id. at 51.
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), was the first
reciprocity-based section 7 decision rendered after the decision in Consolidated Foods.
General Dynamics sought to acquire the Liquid Carbonic Corporation, a proposed com-
bination of one of the nation's 20 largest corporations and the top firm in the carbon
dioxide industry.
The General Dynamics decision offers no clarification of the judicial standard to be
applied to conglomerate mergers involving the possibility of reciprocity or reciprocity
effect. The factors needed for a finding of illegality due to substantial lessening of com-
petition were obviously present - no other decision could have been reached, even in the
absence of Consolidated Foods. The merger would have permitted General Dynamics to
use its enormous purchasing power to coerce its many suppliers who utilized carbon
dioxide to buy their requirements from the new Liquid Carbonic Division. The district
court found that section 7 would be violated by the tremendous power and size of General
Dynamics and its overt, systematic application of a reciprocity program to the already
intensely concentrated carbon dioxide industry.
158 886 U.S. 568 (1967).
159 See, e.g., Sommer, Conglomerate Disclosure: Friend or Foe?, 22 Bus. LAw. 317, 818
(1967). Many observers were extremely concerned that the Court would adopt a per se rule
invalidating conglomerate mergers merely on the basis of size. These fears undoubtedly
stemmed from the holding in Consolidated Foods, which gave rise to the belief that even
the possibility of business reciprocity would render a conglomerate merger or acquisition
illegal.
160 Clorox, the leading producer and sole national seller of household liquid bleach,
accounted for 48.8 percent of total national sales in that market; and together with its four
closest competitors, controlled approximately 80 percent of national sales. The more than
200 minor producers who shared the remaining 20 percent spent miniscule sums (if any at
all) for promotion, while the large producers advertised heavily (e.g., Clorox expended
about $3.7 million on advertising in 1957). The FTC found that all liquid bleach is chem-
ically identical, and that Clorox's market dominance was attributable to its efforts in
advertising and promotion.
161 Procter, the nation's largest manufacturer of soaps, detergent and other cleansers,
produced 54.4 percent of all packaged detergents sold in the United States, and enjoyed
annual sales exceeding $1.1 billion. The top three competitors (Procter, Colgate-Palmolive
and Lever Brothers) controlled 80 percent of the national packaged detergent market.
Further, Procter was regarded as the nation's largest advertiser, spending in excess of
$80 million on advertising, in addition to $47 million on sales promotion, in 1957 alone.
By virtue of this extensive advertising, Procter was allegedly given substantial discounts
from the communications media; and because it produced similar consumer products,
it was able, by sporisoring network television programs, to allocate to each product some
degree of network exposure at a much lower cost-per-product than a one-product manu-
facturer would incur.
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was violative of section 7 since the replacement of Clorox by Procter &
Gamble would raise the barriers to new entry, discourage active com-
petition from existing firms due to their fear of retaliation, induce
retailers to give Clorox preferred display, and eliminate the effect of
Procter & Gamble as a potential competitor.162 This determination
was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that
the FTC decision had been based purely on speculation as to anti-
competitive effects, and that the acquisition represented only the sub-
stitution of Procter & Gamble for the already dominant Clorox. 6 s This
decision rested on the fact that there existed a healthy market with 200
small competitors, 164 that Procter & Gamble was not shown to be a
probable entrant into the market,165 and that no evidence existed show-
ing that Procter 8c Gamble had engaged or would engage in predatory
practices. 66 Finally, the court relied on post-acquisition evidence that
market shares had remained stable following the merger.167
Ultimately reinstating the FTC ruling of illegality,16 the Supreme
Court enumerated the two foundations upon which its decision rested:
(1) the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller,
but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competi-
tive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by
dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively competing; (2) the
acquisition eliminates the potential competition of the acquiring
iri.1 6 9
The first ground upon which the Court relied seemed to be the ex-
pression of a "deep pocket" or "rich parent" theory which postulates
Prior to the acquisition, Procter had commenced diversification into related product
lines. While investigating the possible production of a liquid bleach, it initiated a study
on the feasibility of such an undertaking. The study concluded that entry into the market
by internal expansion would not be a financially attractive proposition, but that entry
by the acquisition of Clorox could produce a profitable result.
162 Procter & Gamble Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE k E. RE'. 16,673
(FTC 1963).
163 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966).
164 Id. at 80.
165 Id. at 82.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 80, 82.
168 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The opinion for the unanimous Court was written by Mr.
Justice Douglas; Mr. Justice Harlan did not dissent, although he disagreed strongly
with both the majority's reasoning and its refusal to establish prospective standards for
use in future cases.
169 Id. at 578. Prior to this determination, the Court noted that this was not actually
a pure conglomerate merger; there must exist a complete absence of economic relation-
ships between the firms involved for the transaction to be thus classified. Id. at 577 & n.2.
The acquisition was more properly defined as a product-extension merger, for the
goods produced by both parties were amenable to similar production facilities, similar
distribution channels and methods, and advertising in the same media. Id. at 577.
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that the entry of a very large company into a market of small com-
petitors not nearly as financially powerful as the larger entrant will
most likely lead to the competitive destruction or intimidation of the
smaller companies. 170 Additionally, entry by a large firm under these
conditions might render entry into the industry less attractive to
those contemplating future entry, thus reducing the potential for in-
creased competition and diluting the pro-competitive influence exerted
by the recognized likely entrants.171 The Court noted the oligopolistic
nature of the liquid bleach industry and the resultant lack of vitality
in price competition fostered by such an atmosphere. Clorox was found
to occupy a position of national dominance, and the interjection of
Procter & Gamble into the market would tend to subjugate smaller
firms into competing less vigorously than before due to the fear of retri-
bution by Procter & Gamble. In summary, it was deemed "probable
that Procter would become the price leader and that oligopoly would
become more rigid."'172
Vigorously contending that the merger would tend to raise entry
barriers, the Court stated:
The major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of
bleach is advertising. Clorox was limited in this area by its rela-
tively small budget and its inability to obtain substantial dis-
counts. By contrast, Procter's budget was much larger; and, al-
though it would not devote its entire budget to advertising
Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term
threat of a new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume
discounts to advantage in advertising Clorox. Thus, a new entrant
would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it
would have been to face the smaller Clorox.173
Furthermore, the merger would, in the Court's view, eliminate the
beneficial effect exerted on the market by Procter & Gamble as a po-
170 See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962), wherein
the court attributed the power of the "deep pocket" to the acquired firm, and held that
the possibility existed that the firm would use this power to sell at prices designed to
"undercut and ravage the less affluent competition."
See also The Bendix Corp., 3 TADE REG. REP. 18,896 (FTC Sept. 12, 1969), wherein
complaint counsel for the Commission unsuccessfully attempted to utilize Procter & Gam-
ble to prevent a merger between Bendix and Fram Corporation.
171 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Mo.
1964), aff'd per curiam, 582 U.S. 12 (1965). The court noted that the "unlimited" re-
sources of the acquiring firm would enable the acquired firm to operate at a loss for
extended periods of time in order to eliminate competition. Id. at 727-28.
172 386 U.S. at 578.
173 Id. at 579 (footnote omitted). The applicability of the "deep pocket" theory to a
large firm acquisition in a small-business industry has been questioned. See Harsha, The
Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity -Condemned by Conjecture?, 9 AN'rrrmusr BuLL.
201, 227 (1964); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78
HI v. L. Rv. 1313, 1343-51 (1965); Note, Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 72 YAa LJ. 1265, 1269 (1963).
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tential competitor. The FTC could properly conclude that Procter &
Gamble was a recognized potential competitor as well as the most
likely entrant, as Procter & Gamble had vigorously diversified into
product lines contiguous to its basic products. Liquid bleach was defi-
nitely an occupant of this area of similarity; Procter & Gamble had
experience in the production and marketing of related goods and could
expect to attain and utilize substantial advertising advantages. Ac-
cordingly, it appeared obvious to the Court that Procter 8c Gamble
exerted more than a trivial influence on the market merely by its
position at the industry's edge.174
The Court's holding appeared to be dictated by the size, resources,
power and promotional advantages possessed by the acquiring firm.
The view expressed suggested that entry by acquisition into a highly
concentrated market, which introduces a potential for anticompetitive
practices (specifically promotional advantages in marketing a basically
fungible product such as liquid bleach) and threatens the entrench-
ment of existing oligopolists and further rigidity of a not very com-
petitive market structure, creates a probability of substantially lessened
competition.
No case concerned with conglomerate acquisition or merger has
been heard by the Supreme Court since its Procter & Gamble de-
cision. The rationale and standards formulated by the Court in that
case, however, have been utilized by the FTC in subsequent holdings,
notably that in General Foods Corp.,17 5 which was eventually upheld on
appeal. 176 Here, the nation's largest producer and distributor of pack-
aged foods acquired S.O.S. Inc., the predominant enterprise in the
intensely concentrated household steel wool industry. The FTC
charged a violation of section 7 in 1963,'17 and ordered divestiture in
1966.178 The Third Circuit affirmed the holding and concurred in the
reasoning of the FTC determination, which had been based largely
upon the Procter & Gamble deep pocket theory, along with the negative
effect that the merger would have had upon the possibility of new
174 386 U.S. at 580-91.
175 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,465 (FTC 1966).
176 General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 886 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968). Another fascinating conglomerate acquisition case which never reached the
high Court was National Tea Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE Rae. REP. 17,463
(FTC 1966). After learning that National Tea had acquired 26 local grocery stores in
various geographical markets during the period 1951-1958, and after noting the trend
toward increased concentration in the retail food industry, the FTC enjoined National
Tea from any further acquisitions for a ten-year period. This decision is notable for its
proscription of future acquisitions absent a finding of illegality in relation to any one of
the accomplished 26 mergers. Id. at 22,702-13 (Comm'r Elman, dissenting).
177 General Foods Corp., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE RaE. R aP. 17,465, at
22,720 (FTC 1966).
178Id. at 22,731.
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entry. The court indicated at the outset that the steel wool industry,
prior to the acquisition, had been a duopoly consisting of S.O.S. and
Brillo . 70 After its acquisition by General Foods, the nation's third
largest advertiser, S.O.S. cut into a substantial part of Brillo sales
primarily by virtue of the advertising advantages conferred upon it
by the merger. 8 0 In declaring the merger illegal, the court held that
the wave of advertising (primarily television advertising) sponsored by
General Foods would tend to elevate the already high barriers to entry
into the industry; any new entrant would necessarily have to spend far
greater sums for advertising to neutralize this competitive advantage. 81
Moreover, a prospective competitor would likely be deterred from en-
try when confronted with the distributive marketing experience and
promotional expertise of General Foods. The court found the element
(so influential in Procter & Gamble) of elimination of a potential com-
petitor to be absent, but stated that the Procter & Gamble decision did
not require this factor in order to establish a violation of section 7.12
Finally, the Third Circuit concluded that since S.O.S. and Brillo al-
ready enjoyed a duopoly, competition would be fostered only if the
balance of the market were protected. If S.O.S. were to gain a decisive
competitive advantage, "this disproportionate strength would contrib-
ute to and increase concentration in the industry. ' 18 3
This Third Circuit decision displays the traditional judicial con-
cern with the spectre of large corporations expanding and eliminating
small, previously independent enterprises, and parallels the recent FTC
and Supreme Court decisions which apply uncomplicated tests to
measure the "probable" anticompetitive effects of a corporate merger. 8 4
Conglomerate mergers generally present extremely complex situations,
however, and are not properly determined by the application of simple
rules. Section 7 was designed to protect competition, and the under-
lying purpose of most conglomerate mergers is not to obtain a strangle-
hold on competition, but rather to attain certain financial goals.
179 386 F.2d 936, 937 n.4 (1967).
180 The notable facts presented were that in 1959, Brillo derived most of its revenue
from the New York market, with 77 percent of its total sales attributable to its 84.9 percent
share of this market. S.O.S. controlled the remaining 15 percent, but after the merger,
S.O.S. was able to utilize its increased advertising power to reduce Brillo's share to 68.2 per-
cent, while increasing its own share to 31.8 percent in 1963. Id. at 938 n.5, 939 n.8. Brillo
was eventually coerced into merging with the Purex Corporation. Id. at 939.
181 Id. at 945.
182 Id. at 946. The court explained that this element did exist in a different form;
the increments to the barriers to entry would tend to eliminate potential competitors. Id.
183 Id. at 945 (emphasis added). This statement by the Third Circuit might suggest
that even if the Procter & Gamble rule did not render this merger illegal, it would be
proscribed by the rule enunciated in Philadelphia National Bank.
184 See, e.g., the Philadelphia National Bank and Procter & Gamble cases, supra.
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Eventually, this basic fact may be reflected in the opinions of the
Supreme Court. Of course, this development would finally terminate
the strained interpretations thus far accorded section 7. Alternatively,
Congress may enact legislation to deal with the trend toward super-
concentration of economic resources (if indeed such a trend exists). Un-
til either event comes to pass, however, conglomerates will be regulated
by section 7's proscription against diminution of competition. The
need for new rules is vividly illustrated by the following excerpt from
an article written by Joel Davidow: 8 5
Conceivably, a large conglomerate acquisition might be controver-
sial because it makes no economic sense, spreads management re-
sources too thinly, creates a danger of financial collapse, deceives
investors, removes a corporate headquarters from a small to a
large city, complicates collective bargaining, increases the concen-
tration of total assets controlled by the top two hundred corpo-
rations, or places in the hands of a few individuals a politically
undesirable amount of power and influence. However applicable
any of these criticisms may be to a particular conglomerate merger,
none of them will be of substantial assistance in establishing that
Section 7 of the Clayton Act has been violated.186
UNITED STATES v. NORTHWEST INDUSTRIES, INC.
1 8 7
The difficulty of applying section 7 to a complex conglomerate
merger is well demonstrated by the Government's suit challenging
the acquisition of the B.F. Goodrich Company by Northwest Indus-
tries, Inc., a large corporate conglomerate. Northwest, incorporated in
April 1968 under the laws of Delaware with its principal offices in
Chicago, Illinois, is one of the nation's 130 largest industrial corpo-
rations in sales and within the top 55 in assets. Its 1968 net income
was more than $52 million on revenues exceeding $700 million, with
total assets valued in the vicinity of $1.3 billion.88 Organized as a
holding company, it presently maintains a controlling interest in Chi-
cago 9c North Western Railway, Velsicol Chemical Corporation,
Michigan Chemical Corporation and the Philadelphia and Reading
Corporation (also a holding company). By virtue of its control over
the latter, Northwest has a controlling interest in the following: Union
Underwear, Inc., Imperial Reading Corporation, Fruit of the Loom,
Inc., Acme Boot Company, Inc., Universal Manufacturing Corporation
185 Interestingly, Mr. Davidow is presently a member of the Evaluation Section,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. He was formerly the Legal Assistant to FTC
Commissioner Philip Elman, and a Trial Attorney, FTC Merger Division.
186 Davidow, supra note 18, at 1237-38.
187 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
188 Id. at 1067-68.
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and the Lone Star Steel Company. 18 9 An analysis of Northwest's 1968
income shows that 39 percent was derived from its railroad operations,
26 percent from its industrial products group, 25 percent from its
consumer products group and 10 percent from its chemical products
group.190
Goodrich, with principal offices in Akron, Ohio, was organized
under the laws of New York and, in 1967, ranked as the nation's 86th
largest corporation in assets and 83rd largest in sales. Its 1968 net
income was almost $45 million on net revenues of approximately $1.1
billion, and its assets were valued at about $1 billion.191 Like North-
west, it is a highly diversified corporation engaged in a multiplicity of
industries. Its various domestic divisions and subsidiaries include
B.F. Goodrich Aerospace and Defense Products, B.F. Goodrich Indus-
trial Products Company, B.F. Goodrich Textile Products, B.F. Good-
rich Tire Company, and Ameripol Inc.192 Goodrich's 1968 revenues
may be attributed as follows: 40 percent from the tire division, 20 per-
cent from the chemical division, 15 percent from the industrial products
division, 5 percent from the footwear division, 5 percent from the
aerospace division, 2 percent from the textile division and the re-
mainder from foreign sales. 193
The complaint filed by the Government alleged that the consum-
mation of an offer 94 proposed by Northwest to the holders of Good-
rich stock in April 1969 would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act,
and a preliminary injunction was sought to prohibit the transaction
189 Id. at 1067-68.
190Id. at 1068. An extremely thorough breakdown of each of these groups into sub-
sidiaries, geographic ranges of activity (especially with respect to railroad operations)
and specific products appears in the court's findings, along with a history of Northwest's
growth by acquisition. See 301 F. Supp. at 1068-69.
191Id. at 1069.
192 Id.
193 Id. An analysis of Goodrich similar to that described at note 190, supra, may be
found in 301 F. Supp. at 1070.
194 The district court described the exchange offer in the following manner:
In December 1968 and January 1969 Northwest purchased approximately 700,000
shares (approximately 5%) of the common stock of Goodrich. Then, on or about
April 21, 1969, Northwest transmitted to the other stockholders of Goodrich a
written exchange offer whereby Northwest, subject to the approval of its stock-
holders and upon the terms set forth in the exchange offer, offered to purchase
any and all common shares of Goodrich and to pay for each share a total of:
a) $20 principal amount of 71% subordinated debentures due 1994 of North-
west; b) 2/5ths of one share of Series C $5 cumulative convertible preferred stock
without par value of Northwest, each share immediately convertible into the
equivalent of one share of common stock of Northwest as then constituted
(which is now equivalent to three shares of Northwest common stock after a
split which became effective subsequent to the exchange offer); and c) 3/10ths of
a warrant expiring 1979 to purchase at a price of $110 per share one share of
Northwest common stock after the split, at a price of $36.67 per share.
801 F. Supp. 1067 nl.
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pending the result of a trial on the merits. The Government's al-
legations of anticompetitive relationships to be derived from the pro-
posed Northwest-Goodrich merger include horizontal, vertical, poten-
tial competition, reciprocity and reciprocity effect violations. Each will
be examined individually.195
Horizontal Relationships 196
The primary target of the Government's horizontal violation al-
legation is caustic soda, a chemical product manufactured by both
Northwest and Goodrich. Characterized by substantial weight and
bulk and requiring special handling (thus increasing freight costs),
caustic soda is generally marketed in the area surrounding its place
of manufacture. 197 The Government contended that the Inland Water-
way Area 98 constitutes the relevant geographic market, an area in
195 Brief for Plaintiff at 12, United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp.
1066 (1969) [hereinafter Government Brief]. It should be kept in mind that the action
discussed herein was merely the motion by the Government for a preliminary injunction
to enjoin completion of the acquisition of Goodrich by Northwest, and not a trial on
the merits of the complaint. The court, in denying the motion, held that it was unable
to find sufficient evidence with respect to a particular product or market to demonstrate
the probable anticompetitive effects of the merger. The Government must demonstrate its
probable success at a later trial (if indeed, one will take place) in order for a preliminary
injunction to issue. Although this burden was not carried in the preliminary hearing,
the district court noted that there existed a variety of areas wherein section 7 violations
could ultimately be proven at trial. 301 F. Supp. at 1096-97. The ensuing discussion of
the case deals with the allegations of the Government and the corresponding response of
Northwest. The facts presented are substantially those found by the district court, and
no prediction is made as to the probable outcome of a trial on the merits.
In support of its motion, the Government cited many cases, including Mayo v. Lake-
land Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940), Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953), and United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The Government contended that it only had to show
probable success rather than the irreparable injury which is usually demanded in
preliminary injunction cases. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651
(D.N.J. 1964); see also United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
In opposition to the Government's motion, Northwest noted that the decision to be
rendered was not subject to appeal, see United States v. FMC Corporation, 84 S. Ct. 4, 8
(1963), and contended that the merger would be abandoned if the preliminary injunction
issued. Thus, if the injunction had been granted, the Government would have successfully
blocked the merger without having presented a complete case at trial. Brief for Defendant
at 3, United States v. Northwest Indus. Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (hereinafter
Northwest Brief). Northwest further contended that the issues warranted full presenta-
tion and determination at trial, not in the hurried atmosphere of a hearing for a pre-
liminary injunction. Id. at 3-4. Finally, in support of its case opposing the preliminary
injunction, Northwest relied on the "probable success" requirement set forth in United
States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518, 523 (D.N.J. 1965).
196 A horizontal merger, one which eliminates competition between two firms in the
same market, has been held to violate section 7. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 337 U.S. 272 (1964).
197 United States v. Northwest Indus. Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (1969).
198 This area included the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and their tributaries, touch-
ing portions of 12 states, and bounded by Chicago on the north and Baton Rouge on the
south. Id.
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which Goodrich sold more than 95 percent of its 1968 product of
caustic soda and Northwest, 85 percent of its 1969 product. 199 Good-
rich was the third largest of 20 sellers in this market in 1968, with
10.8 percent of total sales, while Northwest was the l1th ranked firm
with 2.6 percent of the total sales. Combined, the firms would have
ranked second in the area, accounting for about 13.5 percent of total
sales.200 Citing these percentages and relying upon the Pabst and Von's
rulings, the Government contended that the Northwest-Goodrich ac-
quisition was presumptively violative of section 7.201
Northwest assailed the validity of the Inland Waterway as the
relevant geographic market, but offered no alternative. Indeed, the
primary argument propounded by Northwest in defending the legality
of the acquisition was the fact that it fell within the boundaries of the
Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines202 (Guidelines). The Gov-
ernment acknowledged the fact that the merger was within the limits
set by the Guidelines, but answered that the standards did not define
"safe" acquisitions, but rather proposed that all mergers not within
the boundaries would be challenged. The Guidelines were not intended
to impart the idea that those mergers within the limits therein stated
would be immune from attack under section 7.203
The district court deemed itself incapable of determining the
validity of the Inland Waterway as the relevant market, contending
199 Id.
200 Id. at 1071, 1083.
201 Id. at 1083-84. The district court noted that three markets were found relevant in
Pabst (Wisconsin; Wisconsin, Illinois and Michigan; and the entire United States), and
that different percentages were present in each (about 24 percent, 11 percent and 4.5
percent). Moreover, there was a marked trend toward concentration in the industry which
gave the decision greater clarity. The court stated further that a notable element in
Von's Grocery Co. was the "progressive elimination of competing individually owned
stores." Id.
202 Northwest claimed to have relied upon the Guidelines in formulating the merger.
Northwest Brief at 12. While conceding that a merger may still be challenged although
within the suggested boundaries, Northwest contended that a merger falling within the
defined limits precludes the finding of reasonable probability of success required for is-
suance of a preliminary injunction. Id. The court did not discuss the Guidelines in any
detail, but merely noted that a merger may be within the Guidelines and still be violative
of section 7; the Guidelines were merely a warning that any merger exceeding the bound-
aries set forth therein will be challenged. 301 F. Supp. at 1084.
The Guidelines require the establishment of a line of commerce and a relevant
geographic market in order to show a horizontal violation of section 7. MERGER GUMEINES
9, 11. The Government must then meet the standards of one of five tests formulated in
the Guidelines. See MERGER GumEmEs at 13-15. The applicable test is determined by the
structure of the market, to wit, the concentration or absence of even a trend toward con-
centration.
203 301 F. Supp. at 1084.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that the evidence introduced did not provide an adequate basis for such
a decision. This, compounded by the lack of evidence as to the trend
toward (or absence of) increased concentration in the industry, pre-
cluded a finding that there existed a reasonable probability of gov-
ernmental success at a full trial on the merits.204
Another area in which the Government alleged elimination of
competition by the Northwest-Goodrich merger is the sale of golf
shoes in the national market.205 The court found Northwest to be the
fifth largest producer of golf shoes in the country with a 6 percent
market share.206 Goodrich also sells golf shoes, but these are produced
by other firms. However, the former's shoes are made of a synthetic
material; Northwest contended that this constituted a crucial difference,
inasmuch as the leather shoes that it produced were neither inter-
changeable nor competitive with the synthetic shoes sold by Good-
rich.207 As in the case of caustic soda, the court found the possibility
of anticompetitive effects stemming from the merger to be real, but
apparently could not hold that a probability existed.208
Vertical Relationships20 9
The Government alleged the establishment of anticompetitive
vertical relationships in five specific areas. The primary field was that
of transportation services, the Government contending that North-
west's combination with Goodrich would, whenever feasible, lead to
the use of facilities controlled by Northwest to meet Goodrich's re-
quirements. This action would necessarily foreclose other competitors
from the substantial quantity of transportation services purchased by
Goodrich.210 Furthermore, the Government contended that if North-
204 Id. at 1084-85.
205 Government Brief at 14.
206 301 F. Supp. at 1076. The top five manufacturers of golf shoes account for roughly
60 percent of total sales. In Brown Shoe, the top four manufacturers controlled 23 percent
of the market; in Philadelphia National Bank, the seven largest competitors maintained a
combined share of 90 percent of commercial bank resources; in Von's, the share of the
six largest firms was 85.4 percent.
207 The synthetic vinyl material was suitable for wet playing conditions, and did not
allow for the proper ventilation desirable under normal circumstances. Id. at 1076-77.
208 Id. at 1086.
209 Vertical mergers resulting in the substantial foreclosure of a market to would-be
competitors have been proscribed. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 866 U.S. 816 (1961).
210 Government Brief at 14. Goodrich purchased more than $60 million of transporta-
tion services in 1968. Northwest received approximately $.8 million of this total, and the
Government assumed that once the companies merged, Goodrich traffic would be diverted
to pass through the Northwest Lines area, adding another $3.6 million to Northwest's
total revenue. Id.
The Government, in computing the above figures, included in Northwest Lines the
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west obtained control of Goodrich, it would be vested with the power
to determine the location of new Goodrich facilities and would utilize
such power to place them adjacent to Northwest Lines rather than else-
where.211
Substantially less emphasis was placed by the Government upon
the remaining four alleged areas of vertical overlap. One of these was
shoe components (such as soles and heels); Northwest is an important
purchaser of such goods with yearly requirements of more than $4.2
million, while Goodrich, a large producer of these products, is capable
of satisfying the majority of Northwest's needs.212 Another area
allegedly involving a vertical violation of section 7 concerned PVC
(polyvinyl chloride), a rigid plastic which is developing into a com-
petitor of metal for use in the production of certain goods such as
pipe. Goodrich is the world's largest producer of PVC, while North-
west, a substantial consumer of that product, possesses considerable
buying power in the PVC market.213 The Government alleged that
subsequent to the merger, Northwest could terminate all transactions
with other suppliers, and thereby establish itself as the exclusive cus-
tomer of Goodrich.21
The final two areas of alleged vertical violation involved cotton
yarn and railroad products. Northwest, the nation's second largest
producer of cotton knitted underwear, purchases a portion of its yarn
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, which had been the sub-
ject of an exchange offer by the Chicago and Northwest Railway Company, Northwest
Industries' rail division. The exchange offer had been accepted by the Milwaukee Road
shareholders, and the merger plan had obtained the conditional approval of an Inter-
state Commerce Commission examiner pending full consideration by the Commission.
The Government noted that the completion of this merger would result in the nation's
largest railway on the basis of track miles operated, and the sixth largest in gross
operating revenues. Id. Neither Northwest nor the court objected to the Government's
assumption that the merger would be successfully consummated.
2111d. at 15. Goodrich had formulated a capital improvements program by which
$110 million was to be expended in 1969 alone. The amount of shipping services alleged
to be divertible to Northwest Lines includes goods formerly transported by other modes
of transportation, such as trucking, as well as goods transported by rail. 301 F. Supp. at
1079-80.
212 Government Brief at 15. Goodrich is the third largest producer in the nation,
responsible for 13.8 percent of total shoe component sales in 1968. Acme Boot Company,
Inc., a firm controlled by Northwest, is one of the nation's largest consumers of said
products, and Goodyear is Acme's major supplier. The Government contended that more
than $1 million in goods could be bought by Acme from Goodrich rather than from
Goodyear and various smaller suppliers. Furthermore, Goodrich could replace duPont
as Acme's supplier of artificial leather, and could also supply PVC (polyvinyl chloride),
which Acme utilizes in a patented waterproofing process, and which was formerly ob-
tained from other sources. 801 F. Supp. at 1077.
213 301 F. Supp. at 1075. Universal Manufacturing, Acme Boot and Lone Star Steel are
all users or potential users of PVC.
214 Government Brief at 15. PVC plays a more influential role in the area of potential
competition. See notes 226-88 and accompanying text infra.
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needs from sources which are not within its own organization. Good-
rich, on the other hand, produces sufficient cotton yam to fulfill all
of Northwest's requirements. Northwest could also purchase many
products for its railroad division from Goodrich, which produces
various items needed in such operations. 215
Northwest contested the validity of the preceding allegations both
collectively and individually. In reliance upon the Guidelines, it con-
tended that the Government had to demonstrate a line of commerce,
a section of the country, and a probability of foreclosure of a prohibited
volume of commerce in either the supplier's or the purchaser's mar-
ket.216 Northwest concluded that the Government did not successfully
bear this burden of proof.217 With respect to the claim of probable
diversion of goods transported by Goodrich to Northwest Lines, North-
west also advanced countervailing contingencies which precluded, in
its view, a finding of probable anticompetitive effects. One factor was
the possibility that Northwest's rail routes were circuitous to a degree
sufficient to make the diversion impractical due to the differential in
travel time. Additionally, the fact that Northwest Lines did not service
shipments of less than a carload precluded, in many cases, diversion
from truck to rail. (Consolidation of shipments may involve consider-
able delay in transport, even if otherwise practical.) Also, trucks af-
forded greater speed than rail; indeed, that was Goodrich's reason for
transporting any goods at all at the higher rates. In conclusion, North-
west contended that many of the possible exploitations would be con-
trary to both existing law and the applicable ICC regulations. 218 As
for the other areas of alleged vertical overlap, Northwest relied pri-
marily upon the lack of evidence presented by the Government,219
which reliance ultimately proved to be well-placed. 220 The district
court found the possibility of anticompetitive practices to exist in
the area of transportation services, but held that the anticompetitive
potential of the merger was not determinable upon the evidence
presented. 221 Apparently agreeing with Northwest, the court noted
215Government Brief at 15-16. Among the railroad products were cushions, hoses,
conveyer and V-belts, seat covers and various other railroad car components. Id.
216 Northwest Brief at 19. The Guidelines present alternative tests predicated upon
the type of product market and trends in the competitive industrial structure. MERGER
GuImEL.NES 20-23.
217 Northwest Brief at 21.
218 801 F. Supp. at 1083.
219Id. The only defense established related to the products used in the railroad
industry. Northwest contended that, when purchasing new cars, its policy was to leave
the selection of parts to the manufacturer. Id. at 1078.
220Id. at 1096-97.
221 301 F. Supp. at 1087. The court stated: "The diversion estimates presented were
general and inconclusive."
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that much of the business given by Goodrich to the trucking industry
could not be diverted to rail; and substantial delay would preclude
the diversion of much railroad activity to Northwest Lines. With
respect to shoe components, the court found the potential for substitu-
tion of Goodrich for other suppliers to exist for some items, but
stated that the evidence did not illustrate the extent to which such
replacement would be economically feasible.222 A similar conclusion
was reached in the areas of yarn and railroad supplies. 223 Finally, in
regard to the PVC allegations, the court questioned whether Lone
Star Steel could purchase its needs more cheaply from suppliers other
than Goodrich even after the merger,224 and held that the potential
anticompetitive effects were difficult to evaluate despite the apparent
possibility.225
Potential Competition226
The Government presented four areas in which the merger would
allegedly have the anticompetitive effect of eliminating a potential
competitor. The first was the manufacture of boots: Goodrich is a
producer of synthetic boots, while Northwest, the country's largest
producer of leather boots, is a potential entrant into this field.227 The
corrosive chemical muriatic acid was the second area of alleged viola-
tion. Northwest produces and sells muriatic acid in the previously
described Inland Waterway Area, and Goodrich expected to be ca-
pable of producing a substantial amount of this product for sale in the
same area sometime during the summer of 1969.228 Another area of
alleged violation was that of petrochemical resin and hexachloro-
pentadiene, highly concentrated fields wherein Northwest is a major
producer and into which Goodrich had been considering entry.229
Finally, Goodrich is the country's second largest producer of canvas
222 Id.
223 Id. The court held: "Again, it is impossible on the basis of the present record to
measure the anticompetitive potential of a Northwest-Goodrich affiliation though the
possibility thereof is dear." Id.
224 Id. at 1085. More evidence was presented with respect to PVC than for any other
item outside of caustic soda, yet the court found the record to be lacking in information
upon which a finding of reasonable probability of governmental success could be based.
225Id. at 1085-86.
226 fergers combining an existing competitor with the most likely entrant into a
given line of commerce have been held illegal. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); General
Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (1967). A merger joining two companies, each likely to
enter a certain field new to both, has likewise been held violative of section 7. See, e.g.,
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
227 Government Brief at 16. The Government contended that this was likely since
Northwest had previously produced and marketed a "synthetic upper" boot. Id.
228 Id.
229Id. at 17.
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and casual shoes, while Northwest produces leather shoes and other
footwear. The Government alleged that Northwest possessed the ability
to successfully compete with Goodrich in this area, as well as the in-
centive needed for independent entry.2 0
Northwest, again relying on the Guidelines, set forth the require-
ments of proof needed to evidence a section 7 violation 231 and con-
tended that the Government had not borne that burden satisfactorily. 232
It vigorously argued that Penn-Olin required affirmative evidence pro-
vided by the merger itself that the acquiring corporation was interested
in entering the particular industry, and further, that the acquiring
corporation would probably have expanded internally into the industry
absent the merger.233 Lastly, Northwest contended that the Govern-
ment must also prove that only a small number of potential entrants
exist.234
As occurred in the alleged areas of vertical and horizontal viola-
tions, the court found that the paucity of evidence precluded a finding
of probable governmental success at the later trial.235 Joint marketing
of footwear would possibly give Northwest-Goodrich a competitive
230 Id. The Government relied primarily upon the holding in Penn-Olin, which
prohibited a merger that eliminated a potential competitor. "The mere presence of a
likely entrant waiting in the wings for a time when profit margins become sufficiently
inviting constitutes a beneficial restraining influence on competitive behavior." Govern-
ment Brief at 17.
231 The Guidelines provided for the establishment of a relevant product and geo-
graphic market and then the satisfaction of one of five different tests. The tests are differ-
entiated on the basis of industry structure in terms of concentration and the share held
by the acquired firm. MERGER GUIDEMNEs 26-27.
The Guidelines offer the following test to be applied to the acquired firm:
In determining whether a firm is one of the most likely potential entrants into
a market, the Department accords primary significance to the firm's capability
of entering on a competitively significant scale relative to the capability of other
firms (i.e., the technological and financial resources available to it) and to the
firm's economic incentive to enter (evidenced by, for example, the general attrac-
tiveness of the market in terms of risk and profit; or any special relationship of
the firm to the market; or the firm's manifested interest in entry; or the natural
expansion pattern of the firm; or the like).
Id.
232 Northwest Brief at 23.
233 Id. To support this statement, Northwest also relied on Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Butler Aviation Co. v. CAB, 389 F.2d 517, 520 (2d
Cir. 1968); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 1969 Trade Gas. 72,716 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 183-84 (N.D. Cal.
1967); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,872 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
Northwest Brief at 24. Northwest's reliance on these cases may have been misguided, for
it ignores the potential competitor's effect upon the performance of existing firms in
the market.
234 Northwest Brief at 24. See United States v. Crocker-Anglo Natl Bank, 277 F.
Supp. 133, 183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
235 301 F. Supp. at 1085-86.
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advantage, 2 0 and the merger might affect entry into the muriatic acid
market,237 but in neither area was enough evidence presented to
determine the relevant geographic market or to accurately measure
the probability of anticompetitive effects.23 8
Reciprocity and Reciprocity Effect 239
The Government contended that the Northwest-Goodrich merger
would necessarily endow the resulting corporation with an enormous
potential benefit through the use of reciprocal buying practices. 240
Specifically, two areas allegedly provided the opportunity for such
abuse - freight transportation and railroad cars. The Government
claimed that the merger would allow Northwest to utilize a large part
of Goodrich's transportation expenditures (about $60 million annually)
as leverage to receive advantages from other carriers.21 Secondly,
Goodrich produces various components needed to fabricate railroad
cars, and the manufacturers of these cars might use Goodrich parts
or other products (such as tires) in their other operations in return for
Northwest purchases.24 Northwest again contended that the merger
was not illegal under the terms of the Guidelines.2 43 Moreover, it
argued that the Guidelines actually extended those cases which con-
demned organized programs of reciprocal buying under section 7;244
236 Id. at 1086.
237 Id. at 1085.
238 Id.
239 Mergers between firms active in unrelated industries which create a situation
amenable to the exercise of reciprocity have been proscribed by the application of section
7. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Ingersoll-
Rand Corp., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258
F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This is the first case to be tried, however, wherein the
Government alleged that the benefit to be derived from the reciprocity effect (A buys
from B with the hope that B will buy from A) brought the merger within the anti-
competitive area proscribed by section 7.
240 Government Brief at 21.
241Id. Among these advantages were additional interline forwarding, additional
freight cars (usually in great demand), and the purchase of Northwest-Goodrich products.
Id.
242 301 F. Supp. at 1087-92.
243 The Guidelines give two standards for the determination of a section 7 violation
on the ground of reciprocity.
The Department will also ordinarily challenge (i) any merger undertaken for
the purpose of facilitating the creation of reciprocal buying arrangements, and
(ii) any merger creating the possibility of any substantial reciprocal buying
where one (or both) of the merging firms has within the recent past, or the
merged firm has after consummation of the merger, actually engaged in
reciprocal buying, or attempted directly or indirectly to induce firms with which
it deals to engage in reciprocal buying, in the product markets in which the
possibility of reciprocal buying has been created.
MnrGER GumuEwEs 28.
244 See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 US. 592 (1965); United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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and that the Guidelines constituted an attempt to rewrite existing law
in that the tests formulated therein were alternative in nature. The
Guidelines called for a finding of illegality when any one of the factors
set forth in earlier cases was present, while those earlier cases which
held a merger illegal due to recoprocity presented more than proof of
one factor alone.245 In any event, Northwest concluded that the
evidence presented did not even satisfy the extremely restrictive stan-
dards set forth in the Guidelines.246 It produced evidence of its strict
policy against reciprocity, and further urged that since each subsidiary
was treated as an individual profit center, with each management
having a financial interest in the profit of its division, there was min-
imal likelihood that reciprocal buying practices would arise from the
merger.2 47 Despite these contentions, however, the court found that the
merger would greatly enhance the potential for reciprocity due to the
increment to purchasing power and the broadened range of products
distributed and bought. But, once again, the extent to which this po-
tential would be utilized could not be determined. As a result, there
could be no finding of probable anticompetitive effect stemming from
the merger.2 48
Concentration
The Government submitted other objections to the merger di-
rected primarily against the acquisition of one large firm by another
where both are high-ranking competitors in concentrated markets.2 49
It contended that the Northwest-Goodrich merger would increase con-
centration of assets, and would provide further stimulation to the
trend toward concentration by merger.250 The allegedly malignant
effects are as follows:
245 Northwest Brief at 26. The second standard set forth in the Guidelines reads:
The Department will ordinarily challenge any merger which creates a significant
danger of reciprocal buying. Unless it clearly appears that some special market
factor makes remote the possibility that reciprocal buying behavior will actually
occur, the Department considers that a significant danger of reciprocal buying is
present whenever approximately 15% or more of the total purchases in a market
in which one of the merging firms ("the selling firm') sells are accounted for by
firms which also make substantial sales in markets where the other merging firm
("the buying firm') is both a substantial buyer and a more substantial buyer than
all or most of the competitors of the selling firm.
MEmRE GUMELINES 28.
246 Northwest Brief at 26.
247 301 F. Supp. at 1091-92.
248 Id. at 1095.
249 Government Brief at 22. The existence of substantial barriers to entry reduces the
number of potential entrants, thus insulating established firms from competitive threats.
Large firms are the only potential entrants into certain concentrated markets, and the
number of these firms should not be permitted to decrease through merger.
250d. at 23.
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1. Reduction of the number of firms capable of entry into con-
centrated markets;
2. Reduction of the number of firms with sufficient resources and
incentive to produce competitive innovation;
3. Increase of barriers to entry in those concentrated markets
within which the firms already operate;
4. Diminution of competition due to the increase of actual and
potential vertical relationships among leading firms in concentrated
markets. 251
In conclusion, the Government proposed that the aggregate lessening
of competition reasonably expected to result from the merger war-
ranted the court's prohibition of consummation of the exchange of-
fer.252
The district court agreed with these last points made by the Gov-
ernment in their generic sense, and noted the national trend toward
concentration and Northwest's policy of expansion by acquisition.25
Nevertheless, it recognized that the merger of two large firms is not
rendered illegal by the terms of section 7 unless there is a substantial
lessening of competition in a particular line of commerce in a specific
section of the country.254 Thus, although admitting that one could
cogently argue that the growth of the nation's largest corporations
should be limited, it held that "the law as it now stands . . makes the
adverse effect on competition the test of validity and until Congress
broadens the criteria, the Court must judge proposed transactions on
that standard."2 55
In conclusion, the court emphasized that while the Government
could not demonstrate probable success in relation to any particular
product or geographic market, or with respect to reciprocal buying
practices, there existed a number of areas which, at trial, might yield
sufficient evidence to support a section 7 violation. 25 6 Since the statute
requires a specific finding in a particular area, the court was unable to
base a preliminary injunction upon an aggregation of possible anti-
competitive effects. 257 Finally, inasmuch as the issuance of a preliminary
injunction would foreclose the possibility of a later trial on the merits,
the court denied the Government's motion.5 8 However, in an attempt
251Id. at 23-24.
252Id. at 24.
253 SO1 F. Supp. at 1092-95.
254 Id. at 1096.
2551d.
256Id. at 1098.
257 Id.
258 Id.
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to maintain the status quo to the greatest extent possible, it issued a
comprehensive hold-separate order pending a full hearing.259
The Northwest-Goodrich merger presented a situation wherein
the alleged violations of section 7, excepting those relating to reciproc-
ity effect and concentration, were not conceptually innovative. The
Government relied essentially upon the horizontal and vertical anti-
competitive effects of the merger to substantiate their claim that the
merger was in violation of section 7. In subsequent challenges, how-
ever, the Government attempted to extend the scope of section 7 to
include various other effects that may be spawned by large-firm mergers.
The success (or lack of same) of these efforts will have a profound
effect upon future diversification by the country's large corporations,
and will determine the need for new legislation to curb the trend to-
ward superconcentration. No case has yet reached trial on the merits,
yet the discussion by the court in United States v. International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corp.260 may be a significant indication of future
judicial reaction to the attempted extension of section 7's prohibition.
UNITED STATES V. INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH CORPORATION
Two proposed acquisitions by the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation (ITT) have been challenged as violative of
section 7 - that of the Grinnell Corporation, the nation's 268th largest
industrial corporation,261 and that of the Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
pany, the 6th ranked property and liability insurance company in the
United States.262
ITT, the nation's I Ith largest industrial corporation, is involved
in various aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, including tele-
communications, overseas telephone operations, and various manufac-
turing and service enterprises. ITT has attained its position by pur-
suing an aggressive growth policy focused on diversification by external
expansion - as evidenced by its consummation of mergers with and
acquisitions of 52 domestic and 55 foreign companies between 1961
and 1968. ITT presently has approximately 200 subsidiaries with total
annual sales of more than $4 billion.26 s
The district court rendered a consolidated opinion despite the
259 Id. at 1097-1100.
260 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
261 Id. at 771.
2621d. at 772. The Government has also challenged the acquisition of Canteen
Corporation by ITT. This section 7 suit is presently awaiting trial. See United States v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 69 C 924 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969).
263 306 F. Supp. at 771.
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existence of two distinct actions; each case being considered separately,
and the opinion dealing individually with each case to the extent war-
ranted. The court noted at the outset that while section 7 does not
require certainty as to the anticompetitive effects of a merger, it does
not concern itself with mere possibilities. 26 4 The Government alleged
that the proposed ITT-Grinnell merger would violate section 7 in that
Grinnell would be endowed with various competitive advantages in
marketing and promotion which it would not otherwise enjoy and
which its competitors do not possess, and further, that the merger
would create a probability of reciprocal dealing as the resultant
market structure would be salutary to such transactions.265
With respect to the first claim, the Government alleged that the
advantages derived by Grinnell from the merger would tend to further
solidify Grinnell's leading position in the relevant product markets,
automatic sprinkler systems and pipe hangers, by extending barriers
to entry and deterring smaller firms from aggressive competition.2 66
The Government relied primarily on Procter & Gamble and General
Foods, which reliance posed two questions: that of Grinnell's domi-
nance in the relevant product markets, and the magnitude of the
competitive advantages alleged to be derived from the merger with
ITT. The court concluded that the evidence adduced with respect
to sprinkler systems precluded a finding of dominance, but held that
the data regarding pipe hangers was sufficient to demonstrate that
Grinnell was the leading competitor in this oligopolistic market.267
With respect to the second question, the competitive advantages alleged
by the Government were (1) the opportunity to institute a system of
package selling, (2) access to the financial resources of ITT, and (3)
foreclosure of the foreign sales market to Grinnell's competitors.2668
The district court held that the evidence adduced with respect to
the feasibility of package selling of Grinnell's goods with ITT's plumb-
ing and heating goods was sufficiently conflicting so as to preclude a
finding that the Government would probably prevail at a later trial.269
The claim that Grinnell would benefit from affiliation with Hartford,
in that Hartford could influence its insurance customers to employ
Grinnell systems, was similarly found not to provide a showing of the
264Id. at 774, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962);
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Hv. L. Rav.
1313-14 (1965).
265 306 F. Supp. at 775.
261 Id.
267 Id. at 776-77.
268 Id. at 777.
269 Id. at 778.
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Government's reasonable probability of success at a subsequent trial on
the merits. With respect to the alleged benefit of access to ITT's finan-
cial resources, Judge Timbers found that Grinnell already was in a
position of total capability to expand advertising and offer credit
terms to its customers; Grinnell simply did not need the merger with
ITT to enhance its financial position.270 Finally, while noting that the
claim of foreclosure of foreign sales was on insecure legal ground, inas-
much as section 7 calls for a lessening of competition "in any section of
the country," the district court further found that the evidence did not
demonstrate the manner in which this foreclosure might be achieved,
and could not support a finding of probable success. 271
The Government's contention that the merger would substantially
lessen competition by creating a situation fostering reciprocity and
reciprocity effect was considered by the court and rejected. Various
factors were enumerated as necessary to support a finding concerning
the existence of reciprocity-induced anticompetitive effects, and the
record was deemed inconclusive on most of these points. Among these
factors were the extent to which ITT suppliers are actual or potential
purchasers of sprinkler systems, the product traits of sprinkler systems
which are conducive to reciprocal dealing, the share of the market held
by ITT for the products it sells, the size and diversification of those
companies to which ITT suppliers distribute their products, and the
competitive market structure of those areas in which ITT suppliers
operate.27 The court further noted that despite the creation of an op-
portunity for reciprocal dealing, there was no evidence showing that
such dealing would occur, or that the opportunity influenced the deci-
sion of the parties to merge. 278 ITT produced evidence of their artic-
ulated policy against reciprocal dealing, of the absence of the
administrative machinery necessary to make such dealing practical, and
of a management structure which would resist the introduction of such
practices.2 74 In contrast, the Government contended that once the ex-
270 Id. at 780.
2711d. at 780-81.
272 Id. at 782.
273 Id. at 782-84.
274 Id. at 782-83. Judge Timbers stated that
defendants have adduced evidence that the "profit center" concept, around which
ITT is organized, is not conducive to reciprocity. Under this concept each
division and subsidiary has its own separate decentralized purchasing and sales
department. The compensation and promotion of the individuals who manage
each profit center is determined by the performance of their own profit center,
not by the performance of ITT as a whole. Affidavits of Mr. Geneen, President
of ITT, and Mr. Backman, an economist, bear this out: that the management
of each profit center would resist reciprocal dealing arrangements because they
would only increase the volume and profits of other profit centers and often would
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istence of an opportunity for reciprocal dealing has been demonstrated,
the merger is proscribed by section 7 as a matter of law.275 Reliance was
placed upon Consolidated Foods,276 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White
Consolidated Industries, Inc.,277 United States v. Ingersoll-Rand,278 and
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,279 all of which were distin-
guished by the court.28 0 Consolidated Foods presented a situation where,
subsequent to the acquisition, positive efforts had been made to estab-
lish reciprocal purchasing agreements. 28' General Dynamics similarly
involved post-acquisition evidence establishing the existence of a de-
veloped program of reciprocity, and further, that the opportunity to
engage in the practice of reciprocal dealing was one of the primary mo-
tives for the acquisition.28 2 Ingersoll-Rand and Allis-Chalmers were not
as easily distinguishable, since no post-acquisition evidence of reciprocal
dealing had been presented in either case. Judge Timbers recognized
that these cases offered substantial support to the theory that the mere
creation of a market structure conducive to reciprocal dealing might
offend section 7, but found what he considered to be a pivotal factual
distinction: in Ingersoll-Rand and Allis-Chalmers, no evidence had
been presented concerning a stringent company policy opposed to re-
ciprocal practices, while in the present case there was such evidence
(which the court seemingly regarded as both credible and determi-
native)2 83
The Government alleged that the ITT-Hartford merger violated
section 7 on the following grounds - that the proposed merger would
result in a probability of reciprocal dealing by creating a market struc-
ture conducive to such a practice; that the merger would endow ITT
subsidiaries with a competitive advantage in that they would obtain
access to Hartford's surplus funds for expansion financing; that the
result in purchases of more expensive and poorer quality goods by the profit
center which engaged in such reciprocity.
Id. at 783. See also Geneen, Conglomerates: A Businessman's View, CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS AND AcquisrIous: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 723 (Special Ed.
1970).
275 Id. at 783.
276 See notes 148-57 and accompanying text supra.
277 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970). For a discussion of
this case, see notes 303-15 and accompanying text infra.
278 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). For a discussion of this case, see note 148 and ac-
companying text supra.
279 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). For a discussion of this case, see note 157 and
accompanying text supra.
280 306 F. Supp. at 783.
281 Id. at 783-84.
282 Id. at 784.
288 Id. at 785.
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merger will create characteristics of illegal vertical integration; that
the merger will eliminate actual and potential competition between
ITT and Hartford; and finally, that the proposed merger between ITT
and Grinnell will confer a competitive advantage upon Hartford due
to the resultant affiliation with Grinnell. 28 4
The primary thrust of the reciprocity allegation was that ITT
would be endowed with the ability to exert pressure upon its suppliers
to direct their insurance requirements to Hartford. This could be done
by conditioning ITT purchases on the supplier's agreement to pur-
chase insurance from Hartford.285 The court noted several factors which
had to be proven in connection with this contention, among which were
whether ITT suppliers are actual or potential customers of the type
of insurance that Hartford sells; whether the competitive structure
within which ITT suppliers operate is amenable to the pressure of
reciprocity; and whether the creation of conditions salutary to reciproc-
ity will actually lead to the proscribed practices. 28 6 Once again, the
Government's contentions were rejected, the district court holding that
it had not sustained the burden of establishing a reasonable probability
of success at a subsequent trial.287
The court then considered the Government's claim that the merger
would confer a competitive advantage upon ITT's subsidiaries by pro-
viding them with access to Hartford's surplus financial resources. Judge
Timbers agreed with the Government's interpretation of Procter &
Gamble, General Foods, and Ingersoll-Rand as illustrative of the rule
that when any company which is dominant in a relatively oligopolistic
market merges with another firm, thereby conferring upon the former
marketing and other promotional competitive advantages, the merger
is violative of section 7.28 The court held, however, that while the
legal basis for the Government's contention was sound, the factual basis
in the present case was not. The court noted the evidence presented by
ITT which tended to show that it did not intend to remove Hartford's
surplus and, in fact, had assured Hartford that no surplus funds would
be removed at any time subsequent to the merger.2 19 Indeed, this com-
mitment was required by Hartford since the removal of surplus would
exert an adverse effect on Hartford's underwriting capability. The dis-
trict court further found that ITT maintained full capability to acquire
284 Id. at 786.
285 Id.
286 Id. at 786-91.
287 Id. at 791.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 792.
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capital from sources other than Hartford, and could do so more cheaply
and efficiently.2 0
The Government also alleged that the ITT-Hartford merger pos-
sessed vertical characteristics which brought it within the section 7
prohibition. Specifically, the contention was that ITT was a substantial
purchaser of the type of insurance sold by Hartford, and that Hart-
ford's competitors would be foreclosed from these sales if the proposed
merger were consummated.2 9 ' However, Judge Timbers held that the
factual situation presented indicated the foreclosure of a de minimis
share of the relevant market.2 2 In response, the Government contended
that this vertical foreclosure, combined with the foreclosure resulting
from the reciprocal dealing made possible by the merger, established a
section 7 violation, but the court rejected this contention by relying on
Northwest Industries, and left unresolved the question whether the
alleged anticompetitive effects of a merger may be aggregated in deter-
mining whethern the merger violated section 7.293
As to the Government's claim that the proposed ITT-Hartford
merger would eliminate actual and potential competition between
them, the district court found that the foreclosure of competition al-
legedly resulting from the horizontal aspects of the merger was plainly
de minimis. The Government had argued that various ITT subsid-
iaries wrote life insurance, as did Hartford, but the court found the
combined market position to be less than 0.3 percent and thus insig-
nificant. Similarly, no reasonable probability of success was demon-
strated by the Government with respect to the foreclosure of potential
competition. The evidence presented in this area consisted primarily
of a showing that Hartford's surplus could have been utilized to com-
pete with ITT in various fields through Hartford's acquisition pro-
gram, which had been in effect until the merger was agreed upon.294
The rejection of the final contention, that Hartford would derive
competitive advantages from its affiliation with Grinnell,295 was based
2901d.
291Id. at 793.
292 Id. at 793-94.
293 Id. at 794. The court stated:
The government argues that, even if the vertical integration effects of the pro-
posed merger do not result in a foreclosure of competition substantial enough to
violate Section 7, the foreclosure resulting from the vertical integration effects,
combined with the foreclosure resulting from the reciprocal dealing made
possible by the merger, establish a Section 7 violation. . . . Whether the alleged
anticompetitive effects of a merger may be aggregated in determining whether
the merger violates Section 7, is an unresolved question.
Id.
294 Id. at 795.
295 Id. at 796.
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upon the converse of the argument presented in the discussion of the
ITT-Grinnell merger; essentially, that the insurance and sprinkler sys-
tem markets were not shown to bear the necessary relationship upon
which to base a section 7 violation.29 6
In addition to the specific allegations of section 7 violations
already discussed, the Government presented evidence in both the Hart-
ford and Grinnell cases of the recent trend toward increasing concentra-
tion of economic power within the control of fewer, larger corporations.
This condition resulted from extensive merger activity, and more spe-
cifically, conglomerate merger activity (such as had made ITT the
nation's 11 th largest industrial corporation). Evidence was also presented
which indicated that the trend had reached the insurance industry and
that economic power in that industry was moving toward greater con-
centration. Judge Timbers noted, however, that while the history of
section 7 reflected concern about increasing economic concentration,
the statute as enacted proscribed only those mergers which tended sub-
stantially to lessen competition in a specific product and geographic
market.297 Relying on Northwest Industries, the court found that a
merger which has the effect of adding to economic concentration, even
to a substantial degree, does not necessarily tend to substantially lessen
competition. Accordingly, evidence that a merger may increase eco-
nomic concentration, standing alone, is not sufficient to bring a merger
within the domain of the section 7 prohibition; the specific anticom-
petitive effects of a merger must be proven before a merger can be
viewed as violative of section 7 .98 The allegedly harmful attributes of
superconcentration perpetuated by the merger activity of large, diver-
sified corporations may be, as a function of economic and social policy,
the preferable standard by which the legality of a merger should be
measured, but the court concluded that the alteration of the applicable
standard from lessened competition to increased concentration is a
function of Congress, not the judiciary.2 99
UNITED STATES v. LING-TEMCO-VOUGHT, INC.
The new theories advanced to extend the Clayton Act prohibition
are graphically illustrated in the complaint filed against Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc., °0° wherein three new interpretations of section 7s pro-
296 Id. at 778-80.
297 Id. at 796.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 796-97.
800 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69438 (W.D. Pa., filed
April 14, 1969).
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scription of mergers which lessen potential competition were advanced.
Although somewhat interrelated, each is stated separately and chal-
lenges a specific alleged evil.
The first ground which the Government viewed as bringing the
proposed merger of LTV with Jones & Laughlin Steel under the section
7 umbrella was that the merger precluded independent entry by LTV
into the oligopolistic steel industry. This contention was based not on
any propensity shown by LTV toward such independent entry, but
rather on the fact that LTV was diversification-minded and had access
to the resources necessary to overcome the relatively formidable bar-
riers to entry into the steel industry. The second alleged violation of
section 7 stemmed from the tendency of both LTV and Jones & Laugh-
lin toward diversification. The rationale was that since both enterprises
had contemplated entry into various markets, a merger of the two
would eliminate one as a potential competitor in those markets which
were structured so as to be conducive to new entry. Both LTV and
Jones & Laughlin possessed the capability to enter one or more markets,
thus the merger would involve two potential competitors. While no
standards were proposed, the ultimate decision as to the merit of this
claim may rest upon the number of other firms in a position of capabil-
ity resembling that of the merging firms. The third alleged evil arising
from the proposed merger, an allegation not viewed as relevant by the
Northwest Industries court, was that the LTV-Jones 8C Laughlin (LTV-
J&cL) merger could exert a negative effect on the entire national econ-
omy by eliminating potential entry into concentrated markets. The
method of proving such an effect is, at this point, unclear and untried.
If upheld by the courts, the ultimate value to the Government of
these three new extensions of section 7 will be immense, as virtually
all large firms would be brought within the definition of potential
competitor in essentially any relevant market. However, none of these
issues will be resolved in the context of the LTV-J&L merger, for in
March 1970, a consent decree was entered into by the contesting parties.
The terms of the decree were:
(a) That LTV be allowed to retain control of J&L;
(b) That LTV divest itself of all holdings in the Okonite Co.;
(c) That LTV divest itself of all holdings in Braniff International
(airlines);
(d) That LTV acquire no more than a 1 percent interest in any
corporation with more than $10 million in assets, for a period
of 10 years, without approval by the government.P0'
301 Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1970, at 30, col. 1.
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Subsequently, LTV established a $30 million reserve fund to cover the
losses expected from the sale of Braniff02
ALLIS-CHALMERS
Only one case concerning a conglomerate merger attained final
determination in 1969 -Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consoli-
dated Industries, Inc.303 Both Allis and White were large manufactur-
ing concerns,804 active in a variety of industries. Allis alleged that the
acquisition by White would result in unlawful anticompetitive effects
in some 20 distinct relevant product markets; the district court consid-
ered only three in detail: electric home appliances, custom machine
shop hours, and metal rolling mills. With respect to the first and third
product markets, the allegations consisted of anticompetitive effects to
be felt from the elimination of the potential competition posed by Allis
in markets wherein White was a significant manufacturer. The district
court found the evidence to be inadequate to support such a finding,
as no threat of entry by Allis in the reasonable future was established,
nor was the exertion of any significant effect on the market by Allis
demonstrated. 05 In connection with the second alleged relevant product
market, the court held that the available machine shop time which
could be sold was not, in itself, a separate line of commerce, but rather,
should be examined in terms of the specific types of goods which each
company utilizing this time could produce. Since there was no evidence
on this point, the court did not evaluate the possibility of andcom-
petitive effects, if indeed such a possibility existed.10
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in a 2-1 decision,
holding that the district court was erroneous in its finding that Allis
had not demonstrated a reasonable probability of success.0 7 The court
302 It is interesting to note, however, that in a rare display of independence, the dis-
trict court's refusal to sign the order until such time as LTV and the Justice Department
provide assurances that the proposed settlement is in the public interest. Wall Street
Journal, April 13, 1970, at 34, col. 4.
803 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970). This was a suit by Allis-Chalmers to prevent its acquisition by White, a large,
diversified manufacturer. The district court denied Allis' motion for a preliminary
injunction, holding that Allis had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of
success at trial on the merits. 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969).
304 Allis-Chalmers had annual sales of $821 million in 1967; White had sales of
$825 million in 1968. 414 F.2d at 511.
805 294 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Del. 1969).
30 Id.
807 414 F.2d at 516. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Aldisert accused the majority
of assuming "the broad prerogatives of a trial court instead of confining themselves to the
limited scope of review vested in the appellate structure." Id. at 527 (dissenting opinion).
The majority added substance to this charge by stating:
[IMn our role as an appellate court, in an important case of this type having far-
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found that the acquisition would probably violate the antitrust laws,
since it threatened to: (a) eliminate potential competition' in the metal
rolling mill industry and other relevant markets; (b) diminish potential
independent competition in other diversified markets; and (c) enhance
the power of a White-Allis combination to engage in reciprocal deal-
ing. 08 As a basis for the first finding, the court noted that Allis already
produced certain components of metal rolling mills. This, combined
with the statement of an Allis executive indicating a corporate intent
to enter that industry, apparently convinced the court that the acquisi-
tion by White would affirmatively eliminate potential entry in violation
of section 7.309 The majority also found that, if combined, Allis-White
would be the only firm capable of producing and installing a finished
rolling mill, thus raising the already high barriers to entry into the
metal rolling mill market.310 The second finding - that the acquisition
would diminish potential independent competition in other diversified
markets- appeared to be based only upon the court's belief that ex-
tensive scrutiny of other markets such as construction equipment and
steel castings would supply sufficient supporting evidence.311 Lastly,
the reciprocity finding arose from the combined power of Allis-White
purchases from the steel industry. Allis bought $44 million worth of
steel annually, while White bought $42 million.312 Combined, Allis-
White would account for a much larger amount of steel than any other
competitor in the rolling mill market, and thus the stage for reciprocal
dealing would be set.13 On these bases, the Third Circuit reversed the
reaching economic consequences not only to the immediate parties but to the
public as well, we are duty-bound to consider all issues properly raised by the
complaint and having record support.
Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
The dissent also criticized the majority opinion for its numerous references to the
proposed complaint of the FTC, which was incorporated as an appendix to the appellant's
reply brief. Judge Aldisert appeared unhappy with the majority's acceptance of the FTC
allegations as fact, especially since many of these matters were not to be found in the
record of the lower court. Id. at 529-30 (dissenting opinion).
308 Id. at 525.
309 Id. at 514-15. The dissent finds this reliance upon "self-serving declarations" to
be unwarranted. Id. at 534 (dissenting opinion).
310d. at 518. This potential entrenchment of Allis-White in the relevant market was
cited by the court as an example of "product-extension consequences which may be anti-
competitive and violative of § 7 .. " Id. The dissent found it difficult to reconcile the
entrenchment finding with the fact that Allis maintained no share of the market prior to
the proposed acquisition. Id. at 536 (dissenting opinion).
311 Id. at 521-22.
312 Id. at 518.
813 Id. at 518-19. The dissent noted, however, that the share of total annual steel
purchases represented by Allis-White would be little more than 1 of 1 percent, as annual
sales of steel totalled about $13 billion. Id. at 533 n.13 (dissenting opinion).
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district court and granted a preliminary injunction pending the out-
come of a final hearing on the merits. 814
Regrettably, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari,815
thus postponing any definitive interpretation of section 7 in "pure"
conglomerate merger cases. 16
COMMENTARY
The outermost limits of section 7 have not yet been defined by the
Supreme Court, which has thus far accepted as valid the views of the
FTC and Justice Department with respect to the anticompetitive ef-
fects of the various types of corporate mergers. This tendency has had
distinctive anti-merger overtones, as each decision seems to have per-
formed all tasks necessary to warrant a finding of illegality under sec-
tion 7. Brown Shoe required extensive analysis of each possible
anticompetitive effect of a merger, a requirement which was rendered
meaningless by the advent of a presumptive illegality concept in
Philadelphia National Bank. Instead of the complainant bearing the
burden of proof as to a merger's probable anticompetitive effect, when
the merging parties control an "undue" share of the market, they must
affirmatively rebut the presumption that anticompetitive effects will
arise. A combined share of 7.5 percent of the relevant market was held
to qualify for the presumption of illegality in Von's; the lowest point
at which a market share will be considered "undue" is as yet undeter-
mined.
Questions concerning section 7's applicability to different types of
mergers have consistently been resolved in favor of the Government.
In Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that banks
were subject to section 7's prohibition despite the statute's requirement
that the acquired firm be under the auspices of the FTC. In Penn-Olin,
the Court similarly rejected the argument that the joint venture was
not in commerce at the time of creation. Both holdings were based
upon the congressional intent as perceived by the Court - that the
statute was meant to eliminate loopholes in the earlier law.
314 Id. at 525-26.
315 596 U.S. 1009 (1970).
316 See also Filtrol Corp. v. Slicks Corp., - F. Supp. - (C.D. Cal. 1969).
Although the Government failed in its attempt to preliminarily enjoin the merger
in Northwest Industries, it is now extremely doubtful that Northwest will successfully gain
control of Goodrich. Nevertheless, a trial on the merits of the complaint remains a pos-
sibility, since the Government has not yet abandoned its suit against Northwest. Perhaps
this reluctance may be traced to the Government's desire to impose upon Northwest restric-
tions resembling those embodied in the LTV consent decree. See note 301 and accompany-
ing text supra. The possibility of a trial on the merits no longer exists in the LTV
case, as LTV and the Justice Department have provided the district court with adequate
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The holding in Alcoa provided two rules for antitrust students.
The first was that a horizontal merger would be illegal if, in a concen-
trated market, any large company acquired a competitor, regardless of
that competitor's size. Any increase in the market share of a leader in
a concentrated industry adds to the anticompetitive structure, said the
Court, and thus must be prohibited. The second rule is that the rele-
vant product market should be defined as the one in which the merging
parties control the greatest share. This rule was adhered to in Con-
tinental Can, where the relevant product market was found to be glass
and metal containers- not each individually, nor the combination of
the two with other competitors, such as plastic. No apparent justifica-
tion was given for this unusual categorization.
The Supreme Court has been no less harsh on conglomerate
mergers. In Consolidated Foods, the Court held the acquisition of
Gentry to be unlawful due to the attempts by Consolidated to practice
reciprocity. The reason given was that Consolidated's substantial mar-
ket power had been utilized to sell Gentry's goods, dearly an anticom-
petitive situation. The Consolidated Foods Court did not indicate
whether proof of a mere potential for the practice of reciprocity would
be sufficient to warrant the prohibition of a merger, but this question
may have been resolved by the denial of certiorari in Allis-Chalmers.317
With respect to product-extension mergers, the Procter & Gamble
Court set forth the "deep pocket" doctrine: if access to the financial
resources of the "rich parent" may endow the acquired firm with a
significant competitive advantage to the detriment of other existing
competitors, the merger will be declared unlawful, at least where the
acquired firm is a leader in a concentrated market. Additionally, it may
safely be said that when any giant firm in one area acquires a dominant
firm in a related area - so as to afford integration of production, dis-
tribution or marketing - a successful section 7 suit will ensue.318
assurance that the proposed settlement is in the public interest, but, see note 302 and
accompanying text supra, doubt still pervades the future of the ITT cases. Ordinarily, a
trial on the merits or a consent decree would be the logical development. However,
difficulties which ITT has encountered with a state insurance commission (Connecticut)
have seriously threatened its combination with Hartford.
317As noted previously, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had held potential
reciprocity to be a sufficient cause for granting a preliminary injunction prior to merger.
See notes 303-16 and accompanying text supra.
318 In a recent speech, the Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, Anti-
trust Division, posed the following hypothetical situation to demonstrate the anticom-
petitive effect of an acquisition by one of the nation's largest conglomerates:
Let us suppose that the XYZ Company is one of eight approximately equal firms
in a defined market. Suppose further that the General Everything Company, a
large wealthy conglomerate, acquires the XYZ Company. It has been suggested
that the following anticompetitive effect might result from such an acquisition:
"XYZ's assimilation into General Everything's enormous capital structure
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The Merger Guidelines
In 1968, the Justice Department released a list of guidelines regard-
ing corporate mergers with the purpose of acquainting all interested
parties with the standards to be applied by the Government in deter-
mining whether to challenge a merger under section 7. These Guide-
lines purported to represent the policy of the Government at that time,
and were promulgated to aid corporations which were planning merg-
ers to anticipate possible government action. The Government refused,
however, to state categorically that they would not challenge a merger
which fell within the Guidelines; rather, the Guidelines were proposed
as a warning that any merger not within the defined limits would be
challenged.
The enforcement policy with respect to conglomerate mergers
and resources gave XYZ an immediate advantage over its competitors who
were contending for a share of the market. The power of the 'deep pocket'
or 'rich parent' for one of the suppliers in this competitive group where
previously no company was very large and all were relatively small opened
the possibility and power to sell at prices approximating cost or below and
thus to undercut and ravage the less affluent competition. The Government
is not required to establish that the General Everything's acquisition of
XYZ Company did in fact have anticompetitive consequences. It is sufficient
if the Government shows the acquisition had the capacity or potentiality to
lessen competition."
Address by Bruce B. Wilson before the Practising Law Institute, Las Vegas, Nevada,
August 21, 1969. The above facts were extracted from Reynolds Metal Co. v. FTC, 309
F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The discussion of anticompetitive effect was adopted from the
opinion written in that case by Judge, and now Chief Justice, Burger.
Mr. Wilson's hypothetical does not reflect the true factual situation presented in
Reynolds. Firstly, the eight competing firms in the relevant product and geographic
market were not "approximately equal;" rather, the firm acquired by Reynolds con-
trolled about 33 percent of total sales. Id. at 225. Secondly, the hypothetical contains no
mention of the fact that the acquiring firm was the world's largest producer of the
primary material used in the industry of the acquired firm; a material that accounted
for 70 percent of total production costs of that industry. Id. Thirdly, the court did not
hold the merger to be violative of section 7 solely on the basis of the theory enunciated in
Mr. Wilson's excerpt. The court first noted that
when [the acquired firm] was vertically integrated through the Reynold's ac-
quisition, one ... anti-competitive effect foreseeable was the exclusion of other
manufacturers of raw foil (Reynolds' competitors) from selling to approximately
33% of the florist foil converting industry.
Id. at 229. While this was not the primary basis for the court's finding of illegality, it
could well have been determinative in the absence of more significant proof of the
merger's anticompetitive effects. The court noted that the record presented evidence of
actual anticompetitive effects stemming from Reynolds' ability to operate the acquired
firm with little or no profit in order to "undercut and ravage the less affluent competi-
tion." Id. at 229-80. Moreover, the court found that subsequent to the acquisition,
Reynolds offered retroactive price reductions which enabled it to increase its share of
the market by 18.9 percent in one year. Id. at 230.
The segment of the Reynolds opinion utilized by Mr. Wilson, when viewed in its
proper perspective, merely represents dicta. The Supreme Court has not yet abandoned
the requirement of probability in favor of a standard of mere "capacity or potentiality"
for anticompetitive effects. While certainty is not required to establish a violation of
section 7, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1968), mere possibility is not
sufficient. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
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reflected the traditional goal of preventing changes in market structure
which might substantially lessen competition. Specific guidelines were
given for only two types of conglomerate mergers - those involving
potential entrants and those giving rise to the danger of reciprocal
buying practices. 819 An additional caveat was included, however, to
819 18. Mergers Involving Potential Entrants.
(a) Since potential competition (i.e., the threat of entry, either through in-
ternal expansion or through acquisition and expansion of a small firm, by firms
not already or only marginally in the market) may often be the most significant
competitive limitation on the exercise of market power by leading firms, as well
as the most likely source of additional actual competition, the Department will
ordinarily challenge any merger between one of the most likely entrants into the
market and:
(i) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market;
(ii) one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the two
largest firms amount to approximately 50% or more;
(iii) one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares of the eight
largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided the merging firm's
share of the market amounts to approximately 10% or more; or
(iv) one of the eight largest firms in a market in which the shares of these
firms amount to approximately 75% or more, provided either (A) the merging
firm's share of the market is not insubstantial and there are no more than one
or two likely entrants into the market, or (B) the merging firm is a rapidly
growing firm.
In determining whether a firm is one of the most likely potential entrants into a
market, the Department accords primary significance to the firm's capability of
entering on a competitively significant scale relative to the capability of other
firms (i.e., the technological and financial resources available to it) and to the
firm's economic incentive to enter (evidenced by, for example, the general attrac-
tiveness of the market in terms of risk and profit; or any special relationship of
the firm to the market; or the firm's manifested interest in entry; or the
natural expansion pattern of the firm; or the like).
(b) The Department will also ordinarily challenge a merger between an
existing competitor in a market and a likely entrant, undertaken for the purpose
of preventing the competitive "disturbance" or "disruption" that such entry might
create.
(c) Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not
accept as a justification for a merger inconsistent with the standards of this para-
graph 18 the claim that the merger will produce economics, because, among
other reasons, the Department believes that equivalent economies can be normally
achieved either through internal expansion or through a small firm acquisi-
tion or other acquisition not inconsistent with the standards herein.
19. Mergers Creating Danger of Reciprocal Buying.
(a) Since reciprocal buying (i.e., favoring one's customer when making pur-
chases of a product which is sold by the customer) is an economically unjustified
business practice which confers a competitive advantage on the favored firm
unrelated to the merits of its product, the Department will ordinarily challenge
any merger which creates a significant danger of reciprocal buying. Unless it
clearly appears that some special market factor makes remote the possibility that
reciprocal buying behavior will actually occur, the Department considers that a
significant danger of reciprocal buying is present whenever approximately 15%
or more of the total purchases in a market in which one of the merging firms
("the selling firm') sells are accounted for by firms which also make substantial
sales in markets where the other merging firm ("the buying firm') is both a sub-
stantial buyer and a more substantial buyer than all or most of the competitors of
the selling firm.
(b) The Department will also ordinarily challenge (i) any merger undertaken
for the purpose of facilitating the creation of reciprocal buying arrangements,
and (ii) any merger creating the possibility of any substantial reciprocal buying
where one (or both) of the merging firms has within the recent past, or the
merged firm has after consummation of the merger, actually engaged in
reciprocal buying, or attempted directly or indirectly to induce firms with which
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the effect that any other type of conglomerate merger which appeared
to have anticompetitive effects would be challenged. The absence of
more specific guidelines may have been the result of a lack of empirical
knowledge as to the effects of the various forms of conglomerate merg-
ers upon competitors.
The current value of the Guidelines as an aid to the merger-
minded corporation in determining future action by the Justice De-
partment is extremely questionable. The present antitrust enforcers
have warned that reliance cannot be placed upon the Guidelines due
to the possibility that mergers which satisfy the standards formulated
therein will not be viewed as immune from a section 7 suit. 20 Further-
more, the Guidelines do not represent the substantive law as formulated
and applied by the courts. If the Guidelines were accepted as deter-
minative, they would, in effect, constitute amendatory antitrust legisla-
tion promulgated by the Justice Department rather than by Congress.
Finally, the Guidelines represent the policy of those responsible for
antitrust enforcement at the time they were issued. Inasmuch as the
personnel of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division changes ap-
proximately every four years, and in view of the fact that the new en-
forcers are not bound by the policies of their predecessors, the durabil-
ity of any guidelines is far from certain. 821
it deals to engage in reciprocal buying, in the product markets in which the
possibility of reciprocal buying has been created.
(c) Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not accept
as a justification for a merger creating a significant danger of reciprocal buying
the claim that the merger will produce economies, because, among other reasons,
the Department believes that in general equivalent economies can be achieved by
the firms involved through other mergers not inconsistent with the standards of
this paragraph 19.
MERGER GUELINEs 21-25.
820 Richard W. McLaren, Ass't Attorney General, Antitrust Division, has defined the
direction of his antitrust enforcement as follows:
I am by no means opposed to amendatory legislation, but I feel that the
matter is too pressing to wait, and we are willing to risk losing some cases to find
out how far Section 7 will take us in halting the current accelerated trend
toward concentration by merger and-as I see it- the severe economic and
social dislocations attendant thereon.
Hearings on Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 7, at 2389 (1969) (statement of Richard W. McLaren).
821 James J. Ling, formerly Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., contends that the Government is allowed too much flexibility
in its antitrust enforcement policy.
In my view, changes in antitrust policy from Administration to Administration
and from Attorney General to Attorney General, make compliance a floating
target that no businessman can hit consistently. A company can act in good
faith to channel its acquisitions and mergers well within the guidelines of one
Administration and be attacked for antitrust violations by the next Administra-
tion. Very few, if any, businessmen have any appetite for deliberate violations
of antitrust legislation, but it is impossible for any businessman- or any attorney
- to say with any degree of conviction what national antitrust policy will be from
year to year -or even from month to month.
Ling, The Conglomerate and Antitrust, 25 Bus. IAw. 571, 575 (1970).
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The New Theories
Thus far, the basic reason for invalidating mergers has been the
protection of competition. Presumably, no merger has been deemed
unlawful purely on the basis of size.3 22 But in the section 7 suits
brought by the Government in 1969, it appears that the antitrust en-
forcers are attempting to encompass within the scope of the Clayton
Act those mergers which allegedly have resultant negative effects trace-
able only to the substantial size of the parties involved. This attempt is
most clearly manifested in the LTV-Jones & Laughlin complaint.
The first alleged anticompetitive effect of the LTV-J&L merger
was that it precluded independent entry by LTV into the highly con-
centrated steel industry. No allegation was made as to LTV's propensity
toward such entry, but the Government reasoned that since LTV was
a diversification-oriented corporation, possessing the substantial finan-
cial resources necessary for independent entry into an industry with
formidable barriers such as steel, the merger would be anticompetitive
in that it would foreclose any possibility of independent entry by LTV.
This theory, in effect, would extend the definition of "potential com-
petitor" to include all diversification-oriented firms with the capability
for independent entry into the specific market involved; a firm would
not have to stand on the edge of a market threatening to enter should
existing competitors become lax in order to qualify as a potential com-
petitor. This theory seems to present one basic inconsistency - if a
firm need no longer exert any influence upon a market to qualify as
a potential competitor in that market, what anticompetitive effects will
arise from its elimination as a potential competitor?
This classification of potential competitor is clearly an assault on
size per se. All firms capable of overcoming the barriers to entry into
a market would, as potential competitors, be precluded from merging
with a company in that market. A firm with substantial resources and
a history of diversification, then, would not be permitted to merge with
any firm in any industry burdened by barriers to entry which only a
relatively few firms could overcome, regardless of the likelihood of
independent entry into that industry by the acquiring firm. A major
drawback of such a situation would be the inability to distinguish be-
tween those mergers with pro-competitive traits and those which would
inhibit competition. An example of the former might be the acquisition
of a struggling firm in a concentrated market by a large, well-equipped
conglomerate. The emergence of the previously ineffective firm as a
822 See Dirlam, Observations on Public Policy Toward Conglomerate Mergers, CON-
GLOMERATE MERGERs AND AcquIsrIONS: OPINION & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 193
(Special Ed. 1970).
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competitive force may well initiate more active competition than had
theretofore existed.828
The second allegation by the Government in Ling-Temco-Vought
similarly represented an attempted extension of existing potential com-
petition theory. It was founded on the fact that both LTV and J&L
were diversification-minded and had considered entry into various mar-
kets. The merger of the two, then, would eliminate potential indepen-
dent competition in certain markets in which neither of them competed.
No effect on actual competition in these industries is alleged, as the
number of competitors remained constant and the threat of potential
entry was still present. However, the Antitrust Division evidently
viewed the combination of two potential entrants as anticompetitive.
While this may be true for an industry with only a small number of
potential entrants, it clearly is not the case when a significant number
of potential entrants would be marginally diminished. Another prob-
lem raised by this allegation is the difficulty of establishing the specific
markets into which both firms had contemplated entry. Assuming that
these can be ascertained, the question would then be determined by
the number of existing firms similarly situated. It would appear that
the nature of the anticompetitive effects arising out of this so-called
elimination of potential competition is highly speculative.
The third potential competition theory proposed in LTV was that
the merger, by combining two large, diversification-oriented companies,
would reduce the number of firms capable of entering concentrated
markets, thus exerting a negative effect upon the entire economy. Yet,
as noted above, there are many firms which have a capability equal to
or greater than that of the parties to the merger, and which, therefore,
823 Irwin M. Stelzer, President of National Economics Research Associates, Inc., noted
the absence of knowledge of the extent to which independent entry is viewed by con-
glomerates as a meaningful alternative to entry by acquisition. Stelzer observes that two
questions were lacking definitive answers:
First, . . . even if de novo entry were a practical alternative, would the impact
on competitive behavior (as opposed to structure) not perhaps be greater if the
new management had available to it an on-going organization to use as a com-
petitive weapon? Second, and more fundamental, how realistic is it to assume
that de novo entry is a viable alternative in a significant number of instances?
Concepts of a Conglomerate or a Multi-Market Company- An Economist's View, 25 Bus.
LAw. 579, 581 (1970). See also Stelzer, Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerates, 44 ST.
JOHN's L. Rxv. 196 (1969).
Another commentator questioned the propriety of viewing LTV as a potential entrant
into the steel industry.
. . . LTV's track record does not seem to mark it as a prime candidate for
entry into a basic industry, like steel, through internal growth or even by a
small foothold acquisition. To the best of my knowledge, LTV's principal
interest in the steel industry prior to acquiring the Number 6 company, Jones
& Laughlin, had been in acquiring the Number 5 company, Youngstown Sheet
and Tube.
Adler, Frontier Issues in Merger Doctrine, 25 Bus. LAw. 663, 665 (1970).
[VOL. 44:677
SECTION 7
are also potential entrants into concentrated markets. A diminution of
one in the total of such firms would hardly exert a measurable negative
force upon the competitive state of the national economy.
The most striking characteristic common to all of these theories is
that they make no mention of anticompetitive effect in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country.2 4 This remains the standard of
illegality set forth by section 7, however, and is the standard which
should be applied by the courts in cases involving alleged violations of
that statute. 25
824 It has been proposed that the legislative history of section 7, when viewed in the
context of antitrust policy as defined by earlier statutes, does not require a violation to
be based upon a merger's anticompetitive effect in a specific product and geographic
market. See Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome- A Comparison: Congressional
Policy with Enforcement Policy, 36 FoRDsHAm L. Rxv. 461 (1968). The primary congres-
sional concern, according to Professor Thomas, was with maintenance of a free enter-
prise economy. He has urged that mergers which do nothing more than increase con-
centration of the ownership of economic assets are detrimental to the well-being of a
free enterprise economy and must be prohibited in order to effectuate the stated con-
gressional intent. Consequently, if a merger is shown to increase concentration, proof
of a particular anticompetitive effect should not be required.
Judicial acceptance of the foregoing theory would resolve the complicated problems of
measuring anticompetitive effects and determining the boundaries of the relevant
product and geographic markets. See note 22 supra. The concentration concept would be
substituted for the now-prevalent standard of competition, a result which Thomas
contends is the only feasible method available to the courts which adequately reflects
the intent of the Congress which amended section 7. The propriety of such a mandate-
that courts must consider an increase in concentration as a substantial lessening of com-
petition-is highly questionable, however, despite the support afforded it by statements
which illustrate a congressional desire to arrest the trend toward superconcentration of
economic assets. See, e.g., S. RPr. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1950). The enacting
Congress decided to arrest the trend toward concentration by creating a statute designed
to prevent those mergers having probable and substantial anticompetitive effects. That
statute established competition, not concentration, as the appropriate standard by which
to determine the legality of a corporate merger. Congress must have believed that this type
of statute would produce the result desired; if the wish had been to make illegal any and
all increments to existing economic concentration, a statute to that effect could easily
have been enacted. Thus, in the absence of further legislation, it must be assumed that
mergers are illegal only if their probable effect will be to lessen competition in a particu-
lar product and geographic market. While Professor Thomas' proposed per se rule
greatly simplifies the task of the enforcement agencies and the courts by providing for
purely reflexive application, it is dearly not in accord with the language of section 7,
and probably does not accurately reflect the intent of the Congress which enacted that
statute.
825 In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court viewed increased economic concentration as
harmful in a sense other than purely economic; concentration posed a threat to values
not generally integrated in the antitrust area. Despite the assertion in Brown Shoe that
the goal of section 7 was to protect competition and not competitors, later decisions,
such as that in Von's Grocery Co., tend to refute the present validity of such a statement.
Yet, the goal of protecting small businesses is, at best, a doubtful one. The viability of
a primarily small business economy may seriously be challenged in light of present produc-
tion technology and methods. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether small industrial
units could achieve a Gross National Product approaching a trillion dollars annually.
Thus, preservation of small business may well lead to economic inefficiency, while the
traditional goal of antitrust has been to provide a climate favorable to optimum
efficiency. See generally Geneen, supra note 274, at 785-36. These two goals, then, are not
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The Justice Department has also advanced several theories relating
to reciprocity and reciprocity effect.3 26 The condemnation of reciproc-
ity as an anticompetitive device in Consolidated Foods does not, how-
ever, offer a basis for the concepts set forth in the recent conglomerate
cases. The Consolidated Foods Court seemed to require proof of a
probability of reciprocal buying, not the mere possibility of such deal-
ing. Accordingly, Consolidated Foods cannot be cited as supportive of
an allegation that the mere creation of a market structure conducive
to reciprocal dealing constitutes a violation of section 7. Both the
Northwest Industries and ITT courts justifiably rejected the Govern-
ment's allegation that section 7 would be violated if an increased op-
portunity for reciprocity is proven to exist.
The reciprocity effect allegation - that anticompetitive effects
will flow from the tendency of a firm desiring to sell to another com-
pany to direct its purchases to that company - appears to be an attempt
by the Government to provide a basis for a finding of illegality should
it fail to prove the probability that the company will actively utilize
the opportunity for reciprocity. Such reciprocity allegations may be
unfounded, however, in the context of conglomerate mergers which
involve companies such as ITT and Northwest. For example, ITT has,
in addition to a strict anti-reciprocity policy promulgated by its top
officers, an internal composition wherein each subsidiary is operated
as a distinct profit center with separate sales and purchasing organs.
Consequently, there is no agency by which sales and purchases may
be correlated across the corporate spectrum. The courts ultimately
may discover that this method of corporate operation precludes a
finding that substantial reciprocity will occur.327
necessarily complementary and it remains for Congress to determine the relative priority
to be attached to each.
326 THE REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (hereinafter
STIGLER REPORT) categorically rejected the existence of reciprocal buying practices as a
threat to competition. Essentially, the investigators found that monopolistic control over
one product cannot be exploited effectively by manipulation of the price of an unrelated
product. But even presuming the validity of the Government's reciprocity allegations,
could not such allegations be used to justify an attack upon any large-firm acquisition?
If product lines as diverse as insurance and sprinkler systems (as in ITT) can be viewed
as capable of creating a competitive structure conducive to the practice of reciprocity,
will not all mergers present facts upon which a finding of illegality may be based?
327 Despite the Third Circuit's decision in Allis-Chalmers, the opportunity for
reciprocity, standing alone, does not seem to provide an adequate basis for prohibiting
a merger. If no other "probable anti-competitive effects" are demonstrated, the merger
should be permitted, as the Government possesses the power to enjoin subsequent utiliza-
tion of reciprocal buying practices under various other antitrust statutes. Reciprocity
closely resembles the anticompetitive practice of tie-ins, i.e., the employment of power in
one market to gain sales in another. Tying arrangements have been consistently pro-
hibited under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). See, e.g., United States v. Loew's,
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One last Government contention is worthy of mention- the al-
legedly anticompetitive effect exerted by aggregate concentration upon
the national economy. This allegation applies, however, to the economy
as a whole, and is not confined to any particular line of commerce and
section of the country. For this reason alone, it would appear that sec-
tion 7, as presently written, cannot be utilized to advance this theory.
Although Congress may have intended to arrest the trend toward in-
creased economic concentration when section 7 was amended in 1950,328
it chose instead to prohibit those mergers which exerted an anticom-
petitive influence upon a given product and geographic market.
The Proposed "Solutions"
Our objective is supposed to be competition, but all of our
efforts are focused upon concentration without regard to competi-
tion. Instead of confronting the hard nitty-gritty of competitive
realities in the market place, we embroider upon the old symbols
and produce a whole new book of legal shorthand to sidestep the
tough and difficult task of determining whether a particular trans-
action in fact did substantially diminish competition. Thus, prac-
tices such as reciprocity, which once used to rank with Mom's
apple pie as a symbol of American goodness, suddenly becomes
a dirty word. In 1911, the Supreme Court saved us from never,
never land by teaching us that the antitrust laws forbid only un-
reasonable restraints, today the same Court informs us that nearly
everything that is not de minimis is bad per se.3 29
Antitrust law has, through the years, experienced substantial altera-
tion - alteration designed to meet the ever-evolving requirements of
our complex society. However, one fundamental conflict has manifested
itself from the earliest days of "trust-busting." While our reverence for
the "small business ethic" remains unchanged, our standard of living
demands "bigness" in order to make goods available in large enough
quantities at a sufficiently low price. Society craves for the benefits of
mass production and simultaneously deplores the necessarily massive
economic entity which affords these advantages. The trend toward
superconcentration is presently viewed with alarm; the blame is placed,
at least in part, on the proliferation of corporate mergers which result
Inc., 371 U.S. 28 (1962); Northern Padfic Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958);
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). The FTC may also enjoin redprodty, should it
develop, as an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1964).
328 See note 224 supra.
329 McGovern, The Merger Movement under Investigation: The Pursuit of the Holy
Grail, 25 Bus. LAw. 683, 684 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
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in the formation of large, diversified or multi-market companies. So-
cietal reflexes cry out for the immediate arrest of the trend, and the
FTC and the Justice Department dutifully respond to this call by
issuing a wave of complaints against the most likely targets. Con-
glomerate mergers are a comparatively recent phenomenon, however,
and no real evidence exists with respect to their ultimate effect upon
the nation's economic, political and social structures. Since legislation
addressed to the possibly harmful effects of conglomerate mergers
has not been enacted, the enforcement agencies are compelled to
reconstrue existing statutes in light of the latest challenge to the
nation's well-being. New species of anticompetitive effects are proposed,
most of which are little more than pure speculation as to the true
effects of conglomerate mergers.
Antitrust law today reflects both this lack of knowledge and re-
flexive fear. It is likely to remain in a bewildered state until that time
in the future when substantive evidence is presented which will enable
intelligent formulation of a policy toward conglomerate mergers. Hope-
fully, this policy will reflect both the needs of the society and the real-
ities of the marketplace. In the interim, however, various policies have
been suggested. Some of these advocate per se rules of illegality which
depend upon the size of the merging firm; others advise the enactment
of new legislation or judicial extension of present law to deal with the
possible threat to competition; still others contend that nothing should
be done until further investigation provides facts from which affirma-
tive action can be taken. Certain well-known proposals will be dis-
cussed herein; their dissimilar conclusions graphically illustrate the
unfortunate lack of precise knowledge. Significantly, all call for ex-
tensive empirical investigation.88 0
880 Federal Trade Commissioner Elman has suggested that the FTC is in the most
propitious position to conduct this investigation by virtue of the substantial investigative
fact-finding powers and resources with which it is endowed. This investigation should
focus upon
the actual competitive consequences of these merger-induced structural changes.
We do not yet have the facts necessary to answer the most difficult, but basic,
questions regarding the effects of the current merger movement on industrial
behavior and performance, and on the structure of particular markets in which
conglomerate firms operate. We need additional light on the existence and extent,
as a matter of demonstrable fact, of a clear and direct relation between an increase
in conglomerate mergers and a decrease in competition. Public policy in this area
cannot intelligently be made without knowledge of the facts enabling one to
answer with assurance a fundamental question: Has the conglomerate merger
movement, to a measurably significant degree, in fact brought about a substantial
lessening of competition, or tended to create a monopoly, in any specific markets
or industries?
Elman, Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for "Investigation of the Obscure," 25 Bus. LAw.
675 (1970).
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The Neal Report
Commissioned by President Johnson in December 1967, the Neal
Committee submitted its Report in July 1968. Possibly as a result of
the controversial nature of its proposals, the Report was not made
public until May 21, 1969, when it was released by the Nixon Adminis-
tration. Two new pieces of legislation were proposed -one to arrest
conglomerate merger hyperactivity, the other to decrease the existing
concentrations of power. Recognizing the potential of conglomerate
mergers to stimulate competition in certain situations, the Neal Report
suggested that merger activity be directed along paths which would
ultimately lead to increased competition. This may be accomplished by
preventing any large firm from merging with any firm which is a leader
in a concentrated industry. In contrast to the uncertain standards of
present antitrust law with respect to corporate mergers, the Report
provided precise definitions for each term used. A large firm is one
which, after the proposed merger, would have annual sales exceeding
$500 million or assets valued at more than $250 million in the most
recent base year. A leading firm in a concentrated industry is defined as
a firm with at least a 10 percent share of the relevant market, and which
is one of the four top firms in the industry whose combined market
share is 50 percent or more.
The proposed statute, by prohibiting the acquisition of leading
firms in oligopolistic industries, attempts to redirect large-firm expan-
sion toward mergers which may stimulate competition and possibly
decrease existent concentration in certain industries. The reasoning is
that by preventing large firms from combining with market leaders, the
incidence of "foothold" acquisitions or even internal expansion by large
firms will rise, thus injecting new competitive forces into the market-
place.
The Neal Report admitted that the proposed per se rule might, in
certain cases, proscribe a merger which is economically desirable, but
concluded that the benefits of certainty override any conjectural losses
in efficiency.831 While no sufficient proof exists at the present time
which affirmatively demonstrates the need for additional legislation
against conglomerate mergers or high industrial concentration, the
831 The Neal Report also proposed a "Concentrated Industries Act" designed to de-
compose existing oligopolistic markets. This radical plan provides that when four or less
companies account for an aggregate relevant market share of 70 percent during seven of
the past ten years, and there is little evidence of mobility among the four firms, the Gov-
ernment may obtain a decree requiring that within a reasonable period of time, not to
exceed four years, concentration shall be reduced so that the market share of each firm
in the oligopolistic market is no greater than 12 percent.
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Neal Report proposals would endow our antitrust laws with the greatly
needed elements of clarity and ease of application. Businessmen may
not approve of the proposed statute's purpose or effect, but they could
no longer decry the lack of predictability in antitrust litigation.
Assuming the need for additional legislation along the lines pro-
posed in the Neal Report, one alteration of the Report's Merger Act
should be given substantial consideration. As an alternative to the
proposed per se rule, which may prevent an economically desirable
merger, a strong presumption against a merger could be established.
This presumption would invalidate a merger in the absence of a clear
and convincing showing by the merging firms that the merger would
enhance competition rather than harm it. Such an amendment is not
likely to lessen the impact of the statute, and would allow for the pos-
sibility of a pro-competitive merger that would otherwise be prohib-
ited.832
The Stigler Report
Commissioned by President Nixon, the Stigler Report, unlike the
Neal Report, is rather conservative in its recommendations. Rather
than calling for innovative legislation to curb conglomerate merger
hyperactivity, it vigorously proposes that no antitrust action be initiated
against conglomerates until such time as more evidence is presented
relating to the existence and extent of harm to competition. The Re-
port contains the further recommendation that antitrust laws should
not be utilized to combat social problems which are unrelated to the
competitive structure and function of the marketplace.
332 See Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 ANTrrRusT
BuLL. 1361 (1968), wherein the authors propose a solution similar to that expressed in the
Neal Report. The authors, lawyer and economist respectively, suggest that "those mergers
in which both the acquiring and acquired firms hold leading positions in at least one
significant industry ... will usually reduce competition and its benefits (and should] be
treated as 'presumptively unlawful' under Section 7 of the Clayton Act." Id. at 1362. Like
the Neal Report proposal, all firms ranking below the leaders are exempt.
The Campbell-Shepherd rule differs from the Neal Report recommendations in two
ways- primarily, by its adoption of a rule of presumptive illegality rather than a per se
approach; secondarily, by its establishment of lower market-size and leading-firm-share
requirements. This latter characteristic merely draws a larger number of firms within the
purview of presumptive illegality.
In a subsequent article, Shepherd notes that the proper threshold requirements are
"a matter for conjecture." He suggests that minor adjustments of the original standards
would exclude from the presumptive illegality rule approximately 9 of the 50 largest
manufacturing firms, 19 of the 51-100 category, 25 of the 101-150 group and 12 of the
151-175 group, ranked by annual sales. This compares to the Neal Report standard which
encompasses all firms in the top 175 and more. Shepherd contends that his standard would
be sufficient to prevent the major anticompetitive effects of leading-firm conglomerate
mergers. See Shepherd, The Conglomerate Merger Wave: An Introduction, CONGLOMERATE
MERGERs AND AcQuIsrriONS: OPINION & ANALYsIs, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 45 (Special Ed. 1970).
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The Stigler Report does recommend unceasing scrutiny of indus-
tries with highly oligopolistic market structures. If pricing practices are
found to be substantially noncompetitive, the Government should
proceed against the market leaders under the Sherman Act.8 83 With
respect to conglomerates, the Stigler Report criticizes the Guidelines
for its allegations regarding the elimination of potential competition,
reciprocity and foreclosure. The Report suggests that the Government
refrain from challenging conglomerate mergers on the basis of un-
proven effects arising from size and economic power. Investigation to
confirm or alleviate the fears caused by conglomeration should be the
initial effort. If the investigation points to the existence of securities
law infirmities, appropriate legislation should be enacted. If giant merg-
ers present a real political threat, its dimensions should be determined.
But if no threat is posed, the fears enunciated by the critics of conglom-
erates should be dissolved. The Report concludes that vigorous action
based on our present knowledge of the effects of conglomerate mergers
is indefensible.
Two shortcomings of the Stigler Report should be not~d. Firstly,
no standard or methodology is suggested by which to measure such
abstruse factors as the dimensions of the political threat posed by con-
glomerate mergers. Secondly, the Report does not suggest any broad-
based interim policy which would insure that the possibly harmful ef-
fects of conglomerate mergers will not wreak havoc upon our economic
structure prior to the conclusion of the proposed investigation. Despite
these weaknesses, the essentially conservative approach of the Stigler
Report appears to be the most appropriate one to adopt at the present
time.
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note that two presidential commissions, charged
with assessing the same problem, arrived at such different solutions.
This fact emphasizes the admitted dearth of knowledge with respect to
the nature of conglomerate mergers and their ultimate effect upon our
economy. Obviously, further investigation is necessary, but it is sub-
mitted that the focus of antitrust investigation should be limited to the
economic effects of the conglomerate corporation; socio-political prob-
lems simply do not constitute the proper concern of antitrust.8 34 Simi-
333 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
334 Admittedly, mergers may, in certain instances, exert a significant impact upon a
community by removing the acquired firm's headquarters and personnel, thereby causing
a loss of business to the residents of that community. The best solution to this problem,
however, is not the prohibition of all large-firm mergers; nor is it the invalidation of
mergers having some beneficial effects. If antitrust is to be utilized in this area, permission
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larly, while the conglomerate movement may present serious problems
concerning the securities markets and the nation's tax structure, such
problems are without the domain of antitrust,8 5 whose historical con-
to merge may be given, conditioned upon the maintenance of the existing geographic
situs of the acquired firm, without necessarily negating the prime purpose of the merger.
The allocation of managerial talent or financial resources by the acquirer to the firm
located in a small community may have the desired pro-competitive effect with none of
the alleged social dislocation. All that is suggested here is a broadened analysis of a
merger's effects to include both the positive and negative, combined with an approach
designed to foster the maximum benefit at the smallest possible cost. A determination
which ignores either the economic or social consequences of a merger is simply not the
most beneficial one attainable.
An additional argument was recently advanced by Harold S. Geneen, Chairman and
President of ITT:
It is argued that conglomerates and other acquisition-minded companies
destroy communities- that in some manner they destroy the American Way of
Life. In recent days, the Justice Department has issued statements emphasizing
that this is the evil they are seeking to eliminate. You will recall the change of
emasculating the community by moving the decision power of a company else-
where - the changing of the community to what I think was called a "branch
store community."
While I cannot speak for progress, let me note that a great many of the
New England mills that shut down did so because of something that happened
within that town - and not away in some other city. It was because their manage-
ments fell behind the times, and while people speak with concern about the
number one man in the town who becomes a number "x" man in a larger com-
pany, no one mentions the hierarchy of the sons of forebears who succeeded to
the presidency in spite of their incompetency. I can think of a community in
New Hampshire that I am familiar with -a community that lived off the town
plant. Successions of bad management, mostly oriented to the original family,
drove everyone with managerial competence out of the company, destroying the
mill and the town with it. Maybe a little "branch office community," which today
would be competitive and thriving, would not have been so bad, at that.
Geneen, supra note 274, at 726.
One last point need be made concerning the harm a corporate merger might inflict
upon a community, and that is the propriety of utilizing antitrust laws to solve such
problems. Antitrust policy is necessarily national in scope, and cannot be formulated
with a view towards social consequences in a given locality. Social problems should
properly be solved by methods not within the province of legislation designed primarily
to prevent harm to economic competition.
335 Numerous other attempts have been made to curb the modern merger movement,
For instance, the House Committee on Ways and Means, after extensive hearings, con-
cluded that the tax laws, as they existed prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
provide[d] an inducement to the use of debt in corporate acquisitions and, ac-
cordingly act[ed] as a stimulant, generally, to merger activity. These provisions
include (I) the deduction allowed for interest paid on debt in contrast to the
nondeductibility of dividends paid on stock; (2) the possible availability of the
installment reporting privilege in the case of debentures, which may allow
the shareholders of the company acquired to defer payment of tax on the gain
they realize when they exchange their stock for debentures of the acquiring com-
pany, and (3) the rules governing original issue discount which permit the interest
elements to be ratably deducted by the acquiring corporation, but which is not
ratably reported, by the debenture owner.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 seeks to
abolish the significant tax advantages realized by companies involved in corporate mergers.
Essentially, the new law takes notice of those situations where the "debt obligation"
arising from an acquisition is, in reality, equity in the combined corporation. By treating
the "debt" utilized to obtain control of the acquired firm as equity, the amount paid as
"interest" on the obligation is the equivalent of a dividend, and hence is not deductible
by the corporation. More specifically, the Internal Revenue Code now provides that, when
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cern has been the maintenance of a competitive industrial structure.
Investigation of the effects of conglomerates on competition should
not be bound by an established belief in the viability and desirability of
the nation's traditional structure, however. Thus, while the Neal Re-
port vigorously condemned existing concentration in certain industries,
any obligation is issued pursuant to a plan to acquire a minimum of two-thirds of the
stock or assets of another corporation, and a) the obligation is subordinated to the claims
of the trade creditors of the corporation issuing the obligation, and b) the obligation
features direct or indirect convertibility into the stock of the issuing corporation, and
c) the issuing corporation has a year-end ratio of debt to equity in excess of 2 to 1, or
the interest expense of the issuing corporation is greater than one-third of its projected
earnings, the obligation is to be treated as shareholders' equity for tax purposes, and
"interest payments" will not be allowed as a deductible expense of the corporation. This
alteration is likely to result in higher post-acquisition taxes; a factor which may render a
proposed merger less attractive.
It also became apparent that traditional financial reporting practices, when utilized
by a conglomerate, often failed to provide sufficient insight into the corporation's economic
state of affairs. Since a conglomerate is composed of various divisions, each concerned
with a distinct type of industrial activity, one omnibus financial statement totaling
revenues, expenses, etc., cannot yield the information required by an investor or other
interested party. In order to remedy this situation, the Securities and Exchange Commission
adopted the concept of "line of business" reporting. The conglomerate corporation in its
financial statements, must report earnings by division, and should also give the compara-
tive earnings of the acquired and the acquiring corporation. CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'.
No. 272, at 21-24 (Extra ed. Sept. 6, 1969). A conglomerate's financial statement, by virtue
of this latter requirement, will now provide the information needed for a comparison of
the company's present earnings with its probable earnings absent the merger. Earnings
figures of the acquiring and the acquired firms must be given for the five fiscal years
preceding the acquisition.
Similarly, Congress has not been unaware of the necessity for broader disclosure
requirements. In 1968, the Williams Bill, 15 US.C. §§ 78m (d), (e), 78m (d), (e), (f) (Supp.
IV, 1969), was enacted, aimed at providing adequate disclosure of the character of the
acquiring company to the owners and potential investors of the target corporation. The
statute calls for registration with the SEC of any situation where, as a result of a cash
tender offer, an acquirer holds more than 10 percent of the acquired corporation's stock.
For an extensive discussion of the legislation and recent developments in this area, see
Note, Closing the Disclosure Gap in Corporate Take-Overs: The Williams Amendments
and the Wheat Report, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 484 (1970).
The accounting profession has also sought to refine and improve the existing methods
of disclosure in an effort to protect the investing public from the prevailing danger of
"profit illusion." Thus, the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants has proposed that the financial statement of a conglomerate
would best reflect the position of the company to an investor if the earnings-per-share
calculation was based both on presently outstanding stock and all convertible securities
(such as debentures and warrants). See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, AMERICAN INsTrruTE
OF CFRTFi'm PuBLic ACCOUNTANTS, OPINION No. 15 (May 1969). Continuing its intensive
investigation of the disclosure problem, the Board recently recommended the elimination
of pooling of interests accounting, and the amortization of goodwill over a period of not
more than 40 years. See Accounting- Profits Without Honor, TIME, March 9, 1970, at 62;
Accounting Principles Board Recommends Stiffer Rules for Mergers, as Expected, Wall
Street Journal, March 2, 1970, at 34, col. 2. These suggestions became effective on July 1,
1970.
For a discussion of the policies of the New York Stock Exchange regarding conglom-
erates and take-overs, see Haack, Take-Overs and Tenders: A Stock Exchange Viewpoint,
CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND AcQuIsrrioNs: OPINIONS & ANALYSIS, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 915
(Special Ed. 1970).
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sophisticated technology has caused great changes in our methods of
production, and the feasibility of a decentralized competitive structure
under present circumstances should be questioned. Could, for example,
the highly capital-intensive automobile industry continue to yield the
benefits of mass production absent the presently oligopolistic structure?
Investigation should provide the answer, and should also determine the
most feasible method by which to prevent possible abuse. Possibly, the
regulation of such an industry should be the responsibility of a govern-
mental organ other than the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.
This is not to advocate the creation of a new regulated industry; it is
merely to pose a possible alternative.
To reiterate: investigation of conglomerates from an antitrust
viewpoint should not be restrained by traditional views of competition
as an unwritten commandment, 83  nor should it attempt to solve such
problems as deficient tax laws and securities regulations.
Pending the results of such investigation, it would be wise to re-
frain from a possibly harmful, speculative, preemptive attack. The
creators of section 7 could not have envisioned the statute's extension
to mergers which present such esoteric evils as "a market structure con-
ducive to reciprocity." The traditional standard has been the probabil-
ity of anticompetitive effects; to prohibit a merger which presents a
mere possibility of such is not consistent with this standard. It is sug-
gested that mergers with "possible" anticompetitive effects be per-
mitted, as vigorous enforcement of both the Sherman Act and the
Federal Trade Commission ActO8 7 can prevent the successful utilization
of specific anticompetitive practices.
The antitrust enforcers may also be criticized for their "all or
nothing" approach. A conglomerate merger should not be prohibited
if only one of its various activities is violative of the antitrust laws. It
is suggested here that more careful analysis be performed when a large-
firm merger is proposed. When partial divestiture will eliminate the
probable anticompetitive effects, the entire merger need not be in-
validated. Each merger should be viewed in the context of its attendant
circumstances; there is no apparent need to categorically prohibit a
multi-market merger due to anticompetitive probability in one pos-
sibly insignificant area.
836As Commissioner Elman stated in his article, supra note 830, at 681, we have
both the mandate and the means to illuminate those obscure areas of our present
knowledge which need to be explored if a sound public policy toward conglom-
erate mergers is to be developed and wisely applied, and if national policy favor-
ing competition as the regulator of our economy is indeed to be advanced.
337 15 US.C. §§ 41-51 (1964).
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Although we know not what an investigation of conglomerates
will uncover, we are compelled to go to the marketplace to perform the
necessary research. It is only after such an effort is expended that we
can say with authority what the proper attitude of society toward con-
glomeration should be. As William McGovern has recently observed:
Like the "Man From La Mancha," we sally forth each day to do
battle with those conglomerate windmills, and each night we
return home not a bit disillusioned, in the eternal hope that one
night we may return with the Holy Grail in our hands - though
some economic realist may tell us we have nothing but a rusty
old shaving basin for our labors.8 38
338 McGovern, supra note 329, at 688.
